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This thesis examines three types of the Japanese American experience during World War 
II, based on the central premise that there was not, in fact, a single experience. The 
Japanese American community was not a homogenous group, and different groups in 
different locations had different experiences during the war. The three particular forms of 
the Japanese experience considered in this study are: the mass internment of Japanese 
Americans on the West Coast, Hawaii’s large Japanese population’s escape from mass 
internment, and the relative equality found by the Nisei while serving in military units 
during the war. The incarceration experience victimized people whose only crime was 
being of Japanese heritage, and is a dark chapter in American history that must be 
examined. This is an issue that we must understand, because understanding this can help 
us make sure that it never happens again. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 In 2004, at the age of ten, I won a prize for a short story about my grandmother 
and her experiences during the Japanese American internment during World War II. I had 
grown up with my grandmother’s stories of the past and had become aware at a young 
age of the wartime internment of my Japanese relatives at a young age. Although I was 
merely an adolescent when the history and legacy of the Japanese American internment 
first caught my eye, my interest only continued to grow throughout the years. This topic 
is deeply embedded in my personal family histories because I am half Japanese from both 
sides of my family, and both my mother and father are half Japanese as well. Thus, I have 
a number of connections to the various experiences of Japanese Americans during World 
War II.  
Setsuko Kawashiri, the grandmother whose stories I grew up with, was on my 
mother’s side. Before the war, the Kawashiris lived in California and made a living 
through farming and other agricultural work. The entire family was evacuated to and 
interned in Poston, Arizona when Setsuko was 12 years old. My father’s side, however, 
had quite a different wartime experience from the Kawashiris. The Ogawas were from a 
noble class of samurai who immigrated and settled in Hawaii, rather than on the West 
Coast mainland. It was there, in the Territory of Hawaii, that my “Papa” (my paternal 
grandfather) and his family lived out the war. Nearly all members of the Ogawa family 
were fortunate enough to avoid the same fate of internment that those Japanese on the 
mainland were subjected to, except for my great-aunt Chidori. She had already graduated 
from the University of Hawaii and moved to the mainland before the war, which is how 
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she found herself behind barbed wire from May 1942 until January 1943. Fortunately, 
she qualified for the War Relocation Authority’s preferential early release policy. Soon 
after her release Chidori wanted to help in something more for the war effort, and so she 
enlisted in the Women’s Army Air Corps (WAAC). She made her mark in history as the 
first Nisei (second-generation Japanese) woman from Hawaii to enlist. This complex 
family history helped me discern the multiple aspects of the Japanese American 
experience during World War II. 
 This study goes beyond the typical single focus on internment. Rather, it 
addresses the complexities of the whole Japanese American experience during World 
War II by exploring three versions of the experience. My three main focuses are: The 
mass internment of Japanese Americans, the unique case of the Territory of Hawaii, and 
Japanese American military service in segregated units. The internment still remains my 
major focal point, as it was one of the largest factors in determining the Japanese wartime 
experience. But because it was only those from the West Coast of the United States who 
were evacuated and relocated behind barbed wire, internment does not cover the entirety 
of the Japanese American experience. 
The experience in Hawaii, which was then still a Territory of the United States, 
was different. The ethnically Japanese population was too large in proportion to Hawaii’s 
populace and too prominent to allow the kind of mass evacuation and internment policy 
instituted on the nation’s mainland. Furthermore, merely a few hours after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, martial law was declared over the Hawaiian Territory and all people living 
there, which created a military government led by a head military governor. For all 
civilians in Hawaii, regardless of race, life under martial law became one of restricted 
rights and hard work for the war effort. 
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 My final major focus is the creation of a segregated but hard-fighting military 
unit. The Japanese American 100th/442nd Regimental Combat Team served in the 
European Theater during the war. The unit had two main slogans: “Remember Pearl 
Harbor” and “Go For Broke,” and was highly decorated for its bravery. This group of 
Japanese Americans was actually empowered by the war. Incidentally, in examining the 
World War II military history of Japanese Americans, I discovered cultural prejudices 
and differences between the Hawaiian Japanese and the mainland Japanese. Initially, 
these cultural differences and stereotypes created a rift between the two groups that 
fostered anger and aggression. However, once they joined together in combat, those 
differences evaporated in favor of the bond required by any functioning military unit.  
 Early in my research into the topic, I realized that much of the material on the 
Japanese American wartime experience was constructed as protest, condemning the 
malicious prejudice and acts of injustice toward the Japanese. Frequently, the Japanese 
Americans were portrayed as the innocent and helpless victims of a vicious racism 
directed at them by their ignorant Caucasian neighbors and government. Although the 
Japanese did suffer greatly from wartime hysteria and prejudice, such a portrayal is only 
one of the many different perspectives from which this topic can be viewed. The fact is, 
the Japanese Americans were not a homogenous group that had a single experience in 
World War II. Their experiences varied by location, time, age, and gender. It is vital to 
recognize and consider these various situations, factors, and viewpoints. This was the 
manner in which I approached my research and it has shaped my study, which has led me 
to the recognition of the complexity of the Japanese American experience during World 
War II.  
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One example of such complexity would be the change in the way the interned 
Japanese were treated as the war progressed. During the first months of 1942, following 
the attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan’s apparently unstoppable victories in the Far East, 
fear ruled American attitudes toward the Japanese Americans, especially on the West 
Coast, where there was great economic competition and envy. The frantic general public, 
egged on by the media, created an “anti-Jap” outcry, which played a great role in the 
government’s decision to carry out mass evacuation and relocation. Suspicious hostility 
and stern treatment continued to dominate the treatment of the Japanese Americans by 
non-Japanese throughout most of 1942. As the tide of the war began to turn, beginning 
with America’s first major victory against the Japanese, at the Battle of Midway in early 
June 1942, treatment of the Japanese Americans began to soften. In 1943, as the tide of 
the war turned even further in favor of the Allies, and the US became increasingly 
confident in its military endeavors, the government haltingly switched to a more liberal 
treatment of the incarcerated Japanese Americans. During this year, an increasing number 
of internees were given conditional early releases from the camps by the War Relocation 
Authority. Then in late 1943, the government reversed its policy against having any 
significant number of Japanese Americans in the US Armed Forces and instead 
established an all-Japanese American military unit, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. 
 This study looks first at some background information to provide the reader with 
a general understanding of the historical context. The background chapter includes 
information on early 20th century Japanese immigration, the origins of anti-Asian 
sentiments, common Japanese cultural traits, the wide generation gap between the Issei 
and Nisei, and Nisei biculturalism. My second chapter, the “Period of Moderation,” 
focuses on the few months between the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941 and 
President Roosevelt’s signing of Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, which 
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authorized the Secretary of War power to establish certain areas as military zones and to 
control the alien population within those zones. These special powers were, however, 
undefined and it was not clear how they would be applied or to which groups. This 
chapter also suggests that the government was still groping to find a policy toward the 
Japanese Americans. 
 The following chapters of this study are on the mass evacuation of Japanese 
Americans from the West Coast and their internment in relocation centers. The 
evacuation chapter opens at the beginning of the evacuation process with the first mass 
removal of the Japanese from Bainbridge Island, Washington. It continues to detail the 
hardships the evacuees faced in getting ready to leave their homes – a preparation period 
of only six days being allowed – and describes a variety of Japanese Americans’ 
“evacuation day” experiences. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the 
distinction between an “assembly center” and a “relocation center.” The internment 
chapter begins with an explanation of the War Relocation Authority (WRA) and its 
dominant role in the relocation centers. The chapter includes general camp descriptions, 
layouts, and conditions, a description of daily life and discusses how the internees would 
spend their time, and provides a brief analysis of the situation of the children in the 
camps. Throughout there is attention to the theme of the WRA’s policy of 
Americanization of Japanese internees. 
 The next two chapters discuss the two alternate Japanese American experiences 
during the war: the Hawaiian situation and the segregated military service of Nisei 
soldiers. In Hawaii, tolerant interethnic relations were accepted as a normal part of the 
diverse Hawaiian society, and even after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the anti-Japanese 
sentiment that emerged against the Hawaiian Japanese did not compare in any way to the 
ferocity of that on the mainland. As a US Territory with a large military presence, the 
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islands of Hawaii were immediately put under martial law and ruled by a military 
government for the remainder of the war. The chapter on the military documents the great 
military achievements of the Japanese American military units, the Hawaiian 100th 
Infantry Battalion, and the later all-Nisei 442nd Regimental Combat Team, which fought 
in the European Theater of the war. At first, during basic training of the 442nd, conflict 
after conflict arose between the Japanese of Hawaii and the Japanese from the mainland, 
but by the time they shipped out to the frontlines in 1944, the two separate cultural 
groups had resolved their differences and seamlessly worked together as a single military 
unit.  
The final chapter covers the closing of the relocation centers and the successful 
post-war dispersion of the Japanese across the nation, leading to their integration into 
American society. It concludes with the 1988 decision to issue an apology and to make 
monetary restitution to former internees. 
 I was able to gather a multitude of both primary and secondary sources for my 
research. Many of my secondary sources have been books I found in the Lake Forest 
College Library and then the Pritzker Military Library, as well as countless academic 
journal articles from academic databases such as JSTOR and EBSCOhost. One of the 
most useful sources throughout writing my entire thesis was Personal Justice Denied, an 
official government report where the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment 
of Civilians issued its findings and concluded that the incarceration of Japanese 
Americans had not been justified by military necessity. As an official government study, 
it functions as both a primary and secondary source at times, depending on the quotes and 
citations included in the text.  
I retrieved the majority of my primary sources from the Densho Digital Archive, 
which holds more than 1,500 hours of recorded video interviews and over 12,000 historic 
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photos, documents and newspapers. Densho is a nonprofit organization with the mission 
to preserve the testimonies of Japanese Americans and their experiences during World 
War II. This treasure trove of primary sources includes documents on the Japanese 
American experience from early 20th century immigration through redress for internment 
in the 1980s, but focuses especially on the Japanese American wartime incarceration. 
Aside from the Densho Digital Archive, my remaining primary sources were a variety of 
memoirs and an assortment of personal memoirs and other materials from my own 
private family collections. 
I would like to conclude this introduction with a brief explanation of the specific 
terminology used in this study. Two important terms I frequently employ are the Japanese 
words “Issei” and “Nisei.” Issei refers to the first-generation Japanese who were born in 
Japan and immigrated over to the States; they could not hold citizenship, as they were 
“aliens ineligible for citizenship.” Nisei, on the other hand, are the second-generation 
Japanese; they were American-born citizens and grew up as both culturally Japanese and 
American. (“Sansei” is the third-generation, to which my parents belong, and “Yonsei” is 
the fourth-generation that I belong to.)  
Throughout my study, when referring to the “camps” that the Japanese Americans 
were forced into, I only use three terms: relocation, internment, and incarceration. Many 
of my sources, especially the ones that date back closer to wartime used the term 
“concentration camp.” This usage is actually technically correct: these were camps to 
confine an imprisoned population. However, regardless of the technicality, I have made a 
point to refrain from using that terminology. After the Holocaust, the term “concentration 
camp” has become synonymous with the Nazi death camps. Although both the Jews and 
the Japanese were interned solely because of racist and prejudiced beliefs, I refuse to 
compare the experiences of Japanese internees with the victims of the Holocaust. And 
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this is why; out of respect for the Holocaust, I refrained from using the term 
“concentration camp.” 
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The Japanese Come To America: A Tale Of Beginnings 
“Remember, remember always, that all of us, and you 
and I especially, are descended from immigrants and 
revolutionists.” –Franklin D. Roosevelt 
 
 
 After December 7th, when the United States was “suddenly and deliberately” 
attacked by the nation of Japan and entered World War II, the US government made the 
decision to remove all Japanese Americans from the West Coast in the largest mass 
forced relocation in its history. Although the reasoning behind this evacuation policy was 
officially “military necessity,” one must consider the real numerable factors that all 
ultimately contributed to this decision. Prejudice, wartime hysteria, politics and 
especially fear – fear of sabotage, fear of espionage, fear of fifth column activity – were 
all instrumental factors responsible for the mass incarceration of both American citizens 
and their alien parents who, despite long term residence in the United States, were barred 
by federal law from becoming American citizens.  
 Roosevelt’s declaration of war inflamed many passions throughout the country, 
but particularly on the West Coast, where decades of pre-existing fear and prejudice 
rekindled vicious discrimination against the Japanese. The anti-Asian prejudices of the 
West Coast, which were particularly heavy in the state of California, initially began as 
anti-Chinese feelings. The Chinese were the first Asian immigrants to the US and arrived 
around the same time as the California gold rush of 1849. During the early phases of the 
economic boom accompanying the gold rush, Chinese labor was needed and welcomed; 
of course, soon enough the white workingmen began to consider the Chinese as 
competitors. This economic competition greatly increased after the completion of the 
trans-continental Union-Central Pacific Railroad in 1869, which had utilized around 
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10,000 Chinese laborers. Chinese labor was cheap and affordable, implying it was 
inferior, which only contributed another argument in the white man’s ideology of general 
Asian inferiority, and became just another point to add to the growing list of American 
racial prejudices. In 1882, for the first time in its history, laws of strict discrimination 
began to be legislated against the Chinese at both the state and federal level. 
 Significant Japanese immigration into the United States did not begin until the 
late 19th century, around the same time the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed. The Issei 
were the first generation of immigrants, coming primarily from the Japanese countryside, 
driven from their homes by their nation’s adverse economic conditions. They generally 
arrived, either in Hawaii or on the West Coast of the mainland, with very little money. 
Approximately half became farmers, while others went to coastal urban centers and 
worked in small commercial establishments. Initial Issei occupations were 
overwhelmingly manual, but the value this group placed in hard work, thrift, respect for 
education, and social stability instituted a firm foundation for a better economic future. 
 My Issei great-grandfather, Yasukichi Kawashiri, was one of these immigrants. 
He came to America with his mother in 1912, at the age of 12, to join his father who had 
been settled there since 1904. Yasu’s voyage was on a “Kamakura-maru boat,” which 
was more a cargo ship than a passenger ship, and took a total of 12 days from Yokohama 
to Seattle. The majority of his fellow passengers were picture brides, who were women 
from Japan who had been paired up with immigrant worker grooms by a matchmaker 
using only photographs and family recommendations of possible candidates. During that 
time, the matchmaking of “mail-order brides” was a commonly practiced Japanese 
cultural tradition. On arriving in Seattle, Yasu was required to remain there for 18 days in 
order for officials to check for eye ailments and tapeworms. From Seattle, he took a boat 
to San Francisco, followed by a train ride to Los Angeles. And then from there he 
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traveled to his final destination of White Point, California, to reunite with his father, who 
worked as a farmer on the Sepulveda Ranch in San Pedro. Yasu’s father worked about 60 
acres, farming peas, green beans, squash, cucumber, and tomatoes, and his harvest 
became the first fresh vegetables shipped from San Pedro to the Los Angeles produce 
market.1 
 Just as most new immigrant groups regularly arrived in America with their own 
cultural norms and traditions in tow, the Issei brought their foreign customs with them as 
well. There was a sustaining pride in the Japanese people and their culture, “which 
honored traditional social values and cohesive group relationships, with particular 
deference to those in positions of authority and status within the family and the 
community.”2 That, along with the obvious differences of Japanese language and 
religion, tended to set them apart from the rest of society and promote internal solidarity 
within the Japanese community; when combined with the hostile nativism of the people 
of California, the Issei lived in relative isolation from the public and economic life of the 
West Coast. Ever since the West Coast’s experience with the Chinese immigrants, there 
existed tenacious anti-Asian prejudices; it did not take long for Anti-Japanese movements 
to emerge after the first waves of Japanese immigration to the United States. 
The Japanese were the logical successors to the Chinese in many fields. 
Unfortunately the Japanese inherited the hostility faced by the Chinese as well as 
their jobs. They were of the same race, came from the mysterious Orient, 
demonstrated fairly similar work habits, spoke an alien language.3 
 
 The newly-arrived Japanese quickly became a major focus of California politics 
in the first decades of the 20th century. Their small numbers and political impotence in 
conjunction with the racial feelings of many Californians and their deep resentment at the 
                                                
1 Yasukichi Kawashiri, Personal History of Yasukichi Kawashiri, Personal memoir, Private family collection. 
2 The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Citizens, Personal Justice Denied: Report of 
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Citizens (Washington D.C.: The Civil Liberties Public 
Education Fund, 1997), 31. 
3 Bill Hosokawa, Nisei: The Quiet Americans (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1969), 44. 
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immigrants’ willingness to labor for low pay, all combined to make the Japanese a 
convenient target for agitators. The discrimination the Japanese faced existed in a variety 
of mediums, such as the formation of anti-Japanese organizations, like the Asiatic 
Exclusion League, attempts at school segregation, consistent denigration by the media, 
and a growing number of violent attacks upon individuals and businesses. In 1905, the 
anti-Japanese movement became stronger after Japan’s striking victory over Russia, the 
first defeat of a Western nation by an Asian nation; Western imperialism and the doctrine 
of the white man’s burden no longer held supreme dominance over the East, and to many 
Americans, both the Issei immigrants and the nation of Japan emerged as a new threat. 
 In May 1905, the San Francisco School Board announced its new policy to 
remove Japanese students from the regular public schools and send them to the new 
“Oriental” school so that US-born “children should not be placed in any position where 
their youthful impressions may be affected by association with pupils of the Mongolian 
race.”4 Then, on 11 December 1906, under increased public pressure, the school board 
issued an order barring all Asian children from white primary schools. That blatant act of 
discrimination on the part of the San Francisco School Board became an issue of 
international diplomacy. The Japanese government protested this treatment of its citizens 
and caused serious embarrassment to President Theodore Roosevelt. To maintain good 
diplomatic relations with Japan, he attempted to negotiate a compromise; he convinced 
the San Francisco school board to revoke the segregationist order and restrained the 
California Legislature from passing any future anti-Japanese legislation.5 In 1907, Japan 
and the US entered into the “Gentleman’s Agreement,” under which Japan agreed not to 
issue any more workers’ passports valid for the continental United States, and to restrict 
                                                
4 Commission on Wartime Relocation, Personal Justice, 33. 
5 J. Burton, M. Farrell, F. Lord and R. Lord, Confinement and Ethnicity: An Overview of World War II 
Japanese American Relocation Sites (United States: National Park Service’s Western Archeological and Conservation 
Center, 2000). 
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passport issuance to “laborers who have already been in America and to the parents, 
wives and children of laborers already resident there.”6 This agreement sharply curtailed 
Japanese immigration, but did not eliminate it completely. 
 The persecution of Japanese Americans ferociously increased as the years went 
by. In 1913, California passed the Alien Land Law, which prohibited the ownership of 
agricultural land by any “aliens ineligible to citizenship.” In 1920, a harsher Alien Land 
Act was passed as well, to prohibit leasing and sharecropping for all Issei. Both laws 
rested on the earlier Asian Exclusion Acts, which legally stated that Asians were aliens 
ineligible for citizenship. “The law did not permit Orientals to become American citizens, 
and because they were ineligible to citizenship, they were entitled to fewer rights than 
other immigrants.”7 However, some Japanese cleverly found ways around such laws. 
Yasukichi Kawashiri’s father ran his own farm until World War II by having the land 
officially leased by a group of Nisei citizens, who owned the lease right. The Kawashiri 
farm shared its produce with the landowners, running it like an underground 
sharecropper’s holding (since sharecropping was illegal for Issei as well). It was a 
mutually beneficial and efficient system, according to Yasu who recalled, “As farmers, 
we [Japanese] took good care of the land, so the landowners liked them to farm.”8 
Although the Issei and Nisei generally worked well together, after 1924 a distinct 
generation gap developed between the two as a side effect of the Immigration Act of 
1924, which prohibited any further Japanese immigration. The promise of America was 
no longer an option for the Japanese. 
 Farming was the predominant occupation among the Issei, with about half of the 
Japanese residing in California engaged in agriculture. Agricultural work paid by the 
                                                
6 Commission on Wartime Relocation, Personal Justice, 34. 
7 Hosokawa, Nisei, 84. 
8 Kawashiri, Personal History.  
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piece, which meant that meager incomes at first could be increased by hard work, which 
was exactly what the Issei did. Their economic advancement was built on hard work, 
frugality and a disciplined willingness to save and invest.9 One of the major elements in 
the popular protests against the Japanese immigrants was a combination of economic 
factors and envy. Many of the competing Caucasian farmers were green with envy when 
they saw that the Issei farmers were becoming successful, especially as they were raising 
fruits and vegetables in soil that most had considered infertile.  
 Another underlying feature of anti-Japanese sentiment was increasing fear of 
Japanese military power. It led to a more militarized version of the general fear of the 
“Yellow Peril.” After the Russo-Japanese War proved that the Japanese were a force to 
be reckoned with, rumors began to circulate around California that Japan would organize 
the wealth and manpower of China to provide and equip armies with the strength to 
revive the power of Genghis Khan and create a real “yellow peril.” Such rumors said 
there would be “hordes of Asians overpowering and subjugating a scattered white 
population strung out along the immense Pacific Coast.”10 Now Japan, having shed its 
out-dated feudal system, was emerging in the East as a reinvented ambitious, 
authoritarian and imperialist nation, emanating power as the Empire of Japan. 
 As natives of Japan, the Issei were born into a nation characterized by pride, 
strong moral convictions, and community cohesiveness that were based on the 
fundamental themes of family, work, duty and love. The Japanese dedicate themselves to 
living out their lives in strict adherence to their cultural code and conduct, whose 
fundamental foundations directly trace back to the ancient Chinese teachings of 
Confucius. He preached that social order demanded a strict hierarchical structuring of the 
classes and conformity by all people, who were called upon everywhere “to accept 
                                                
9 Commission on Wartime Relocation, Personal Justice, 44. 
10 Commission on Wartime Relocation, Personal Justice, 37. 
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without question their lots in life and to place highest value in the performance of such 
duties as filial piety to their parents and loyalty to their overlords.”11 Perhaps the most 
important aspect of Japanese ideology was its emphasis on giri, or duty, over feelings, 
which was the basis of the samurai’s high moral commitment to “duty above all,” and 
was essential to their code of bushido, “the way of the warrior.”12 Its main concern lay in 
ideas of honor and loyalty. My own great-grandmother, Momoyo Ogawa, was the 
adopted daughter of the highly respected samurai, Ryujiro Ogawa, and was therefore 
raised in a life of high class and privilege. When Momoyo learned about the code of 
bushido as a young child, it made a great impression on her and later came to direct her 
way of life.13 
 As the Issei immigrated into the United States, early discrimination against the 
Japanese forced them into segregated living patterns and delayed their cultural 
assimilation. So the Issei responded by raising their American-born offspring within a 
distinctly Japanese cultural environment. The Nisei were first taught respect for parents 
and elders, and then other Japanese virtues such as self-reliance, obligation and hard 
work. The strict discipline of filial piety, the primary duty of respect, obedience and care 
for one’s parents and elderly relations, along with giri were the most important Japanese 
cultural norms to respect and honor; obedience and duty were expected of all children, 
and were taught through observance, not verbal communication.14 Filial relations in 
Japan were described in terms of “unambiguous statuses with attached rights and 
duties.”15 Individual choice had little place in Japanese filial relations because duty 
always took precedence over one’s personal desires and feelings. Priority of duty always 
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triumphed over individual wishes; emotional restraint and an absence of displays of 
affection were expected. 
 The Nisei generation was raised to hold onto and cherish the family, tradition, 
language, food, and imbedded culture that constituted their Japanese cultural identity. 
Yet, they were also Americans. The Nisei grew up in a different world than their parents, 
a world where they lived and identified with a mixed culture that was both Japanese and 
American. Their lives were largely shaped around the American model, and many came 
to identify more closely with American values, which greatly contributed to the wide 
generation gap between the Issei and Nisei. While the Issei had primarily been born and 
raised in Japan during the Meiji period, when the nation was shifting from an isolated, 
out-dated feudal system into a modernized state, their Nisei children were born, raised, 
and educated in the American system, which far surpassed Japan in modernity and 
economic progress. Because their immigrant parents were aliens, the Nisei were afforded 
opportunities that were unavailable to their parents. While they were still subject to 
prejudice and racism in American society, the restricted prospects offered to Japanese 
Americans in the US still far surpassed the opportunities Japan could have offered.  
Remarkably, the country of Japan still required the birth of all Japanese boys in the 
United States to be reported to the Japanese consulate, but not the girls. All boys were 
required by the Japanese government to be reported so that there would be a record of 
them in the event that Japan needed to call them for military duty. “But [my great-
grandmother Momoyo Ogawa] felt her American born children were better off here…. 
The boys’ dual citizenship was revoked as their Japanese citizenship was cancelled.”16 
Although the Issei generation had been decreed “aliens ineligible for citizenship” and 
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denied citizenship themselves, they wanted their children to benefit from the bountiful 
opportunities American citizenship would provide for them. 
 
  
 18 
 
From Pearl Harbor to Mass Evacuation: A Period of Moderation 
“The very ink with which history is written is merely 
fluid prejudice.” –Mark Twain 
 
  
 December 7 began in the usual way – early morning, blue sky, and the promise of 
a fine Sunday. Suddenly, without any warning, the peace and silence of morning was 
shattered by an unexpected wave of low-flying planes bearing the distinct insignia of the 
Japanese rising sun and America found itself set on a new course through history – one 
that plunged the nation into a world war and transformed a generation. The surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor inflicted major loss and damage upon the United States Naval 
Forces, and delivered to military personnel even greater psychological shock. Young 
sailors jumped off burning ships, only to struggle in the oil and flames of the waters 
along Battleship Row. Many were rescued by local Hawaiians who swam out to bring the 
Americans to shore. One of the rescuers later recalled, “Some were unconscious, some 
were dead. So I spent the rest of the day swimming inside the harbor, along with some 
other Hawaiians. I brought out I don’t know how many bodies and how many were alive 
and how many dead.”17  
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The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, National Archives.18 
 That day, the nation suffered one of its worst wartime losses of about 2,340 
military personnel and 49 civilians at various locations around Oahu. The greatest loss, 
1,177 casualties, was suffered by the USS Arizona alone.19 The terrible tragedy of Pearl 
Harbor shocked the general public, and quickly led to feelings of fierce outrage against 
the Japanese for their violent and unprovoked assault on America. Faced with the real 
threat of a dangerously aggressive enemy, the nation united in a powerful surge of 
patriotic solidarity felt throughout the country. “Remember Pearl Harbor!” quickly 
became America’s new battle cry, to inspire and equip the nation with the sense of 
readiness and strength required during wartime. It galvanized the country against the 
enemies of the United States, propelling them into the war on both the European and the 
Pacific fronts. Pearl Harbor symbolized America’s entry into World War II and became 
the rallying symbol of American resolve to fight for their victory. 
“Yesterday, December 7, 1941 – a date which will live in infamy – the United 
States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the 
                                                
18 Daniel S. Davis, Behind Barbed Wire: The Imprisonment of Japanese Americans During World War II 
(New York: E.P. Dutton, 1982), 3. 
19 Jan Tenbruggencate and Daniel Martinez, “Pearl Harbor: A Nation Remembers,” Honolulu Star-
Advertiser, 8 March 2011, 2. 
 20 
Empire of Japan.”20 After three difficult years of seeking to avoid conflict and maintain 
international neutrality, war had become quite unavoidable. Early Sunday morning, 7 
December 1941, the Empire of the Rising Sun brought war directly to America’s 
doorstep. One day later, on 8 December, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered his 
famous “Day of Infamy” speech to the nation. Officially addressing to Congress, 
Roosevelt sought approval for a declaration of war in his conclusion to the speech: “I ask 
that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on 
Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed between the United States and the 
Japanese Empire.”21  
 
Front page of Honolulu Star-Bulletin on morning of December 7th, Private family collection. 
 However, the December 7th date destined to live in infamy not only inspired a 
nationalistic fervor for war, but also set the stage for the prejudiced and controversial 
decision to intern Japanese Americans.  On the eve of Pearl Harbor, the census showed 
just over 125,000 persons of Japanese birth or ancestry in the continental United States, 
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while another 150,000 lived in the Territory of Hawaii.22 Of that total, an estimated 
40,000 were native-born Japanese immigrant Issei, many of whom had lived, raised their 
children, and been successfully established in the States for over 25 years. Their Nisei 
offspring numbered around 70,000, and were predominantly American-born, raised, and 
educated teenagers and young adults, most of whom were indistinguishable in speech, 
dress, manner, ideals and attitudes from other Americans of the same age. The census 
also included one other group of about 70,000 young people known as Kibei, who had 
been born in America but had received three or more years of education and 
“indoctrination” in Japan after the age of 13.23 Later on December 7th, following the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt immediately issued Presidential 
Proclamation No. 2525, which declared all Japanese noncitizen Issei as enemy aliens who 
were liable to restraint. For the Japanese American Nisei, “the attack had suddenly 
changed our parents into enemy aliens.”24 
 Ironically, despite Presidential Proclamation No. 2525 and after Pearl Harbor, the 
United States became concerned for the personal safety of the representatives of the 
Japanese government. It quickly moved to post guards around the consulates:  
The State Department pledged full protection for all official Japanese and their 
establishments in the United States and its territories and at once considered the 
possibility of exchanging Japanese nationals in the United States, including 
diplomats and newspaper correspondents, for Americans in Japan.25 
 
With approximately 500 Americans in Japan and 5,000 in occupied China at the outbreak 
of the war, it became vital for the US to secure the safety of the Japanese living in the 
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states as means of protection for the Americans who were abroad in either Japan or 
China. 
 After Pearl Harbor, the majority of public opinion took an anti-Japanese track. 
Many non-Japanese Americans agreed that Japan was their nation’s biggest threat, but 
the original hostility they directed toward the Empire of Japan tended to turn into hostility 
against Japanese Americans as well. “Americans had spent a century learning to hate and 
fear the Japanese, and after the catastrophe of Pearl Harbor they lashed out – half in habit, 
and half in frustration – at the only available enemy.”26 The weeks that followed 
December 7th focused on the potential prospects of a West Coast invasion; Californians 
feared air raids, espionage and sabotage, which they saw as more and more likely. This 
paranoia produced intense war hysteria, which fueled an alarming atmosphere of fear and 
panic that “was itself capable of producing a profound public reaction against Japanese 
nationals and American citizens of Japanese ancestry.”27  
One such profound public reaction against the Japanese came from the patriotic 
organization known as the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West. Through their 
publication, the Grizzly Bear, they lectured their fellow Californians:  
We told you so. Had the warnings been heeded – had the federal and state 
authorities been “on the alert,” and rigidly enforced the Exclusion Law and the 
Alien Land Law… had the legislation been enacted denying citizenship to 
offspring of all aliens ineligible to citizenship… had Japan been denied the 
privilege of using California as a breeding ground for dual-citizens (Nisei); - the 
treacherous Japs probably would not have attacked Pearl Harbor December 7, 
1941, and this country would not today be at war with Japan.28 
 
By assigning the blame for Pearl Harbor and the war to the Japanese Americans, they 
were able to strengthen their argument for complete Japanese evacuation. In one 
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particularly vicious call for Japanese removal, the Los Angeles Times declared that, “a 
viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched – so a Japanese American, born 
of Japanese parents – grows up to be a Japanese, not an American.”29 
 A fierce anti-Japanese sentiment had come to grip the nation as a wartime 
obsession. The lives of Japanese Americans grew increasingly difficult as they were 
subject to more and more prejudiced abuse. On the night of December 7th, across the 
country, Larry Tajiri, a Japanese American newspaperman was walking up Times Square.  
We may have been a little ashamed of our faces as we walked through those 
crowded New York streets on that December night…. We are Americans by 
every right, birth, education and belief, but our faces are those of the enemy…30 
 
 In an attempt to prove their loyalty and avoid persecution by the government, many 
Japanese American families made the heavy decision to part with their significant 
sentimental and cultural mementos of Japan. They feared that clinging to their Japanese-
language books and magazines, as well as family photos and other items of inheritance, 
would be misunderstood by the American government. Some families decided to bury 
their ancient and priceless samurai sword heirlooms deep in their backyard, with a sliver 
of hope that they would still be there after the war. Other families burned other distinctly 
Japanese items, such as their Buddhist family shrines, ceremonial dolls and Japanese-
style clothing.  
Another misfortune soon befell the Issei, who could no longer touch their U.S. 
bank accounts or gain access to any of their money. Following the declaration of war, 
relations between the United States and Japan had degenerated until their economic 
relations were completely severed and all alien assets were frozen. Whenever any Nisei 
needed to visit the bank, they were required to bring their birth certificates as proof of 
their American citizenship that was not subject to the freeze. Aside from the financial 
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problems Issei and Nisei adults faced, painful social barriers sprang up against the 
Japanese and primarily affected the youth. One example of the social exclusion Japanese 
children faced was illustrated in the memoir of Kay Uno, a little nine-year-old Japanese 
girl who was in third grade at the time of Pearl Harbor. She lived six blocks from her 
school and would always enjoy her walk there because everybody knew her and always 
shouted friendly greetings towards her. But after December 7th, on “Monday, they turned 
their backs on me. ‘There goes that little Jap!’ I’m looking around. Who’s a Jap? Who’s a 
Jap? Then it dawned on me, I’m the Jap.’”31 And that was only on her walk to school. At 
school, she found that the attack of December 7th had turned her into an object of 
prejudice: 
After Pearl Harbor, the kids began to shun me. My friends. One person started it, 
and then pretty soon it went throughout the school. My classmates were the last 
ones to leave me. My teacher and the music teacher were both very supportive all 
through the time. When I had to leave, one of them gave me a gift, a gold leaf pin. 
It was the first real piece of jewelry I ever had. I still have it.32 
 
Although Kay had lost all her friends because of her race, she was lucky enough to have 
kind and supportive teachers who still treated her like a human being, instead of as a 
“dirty Jap.” 
 Fear of Japanese espionage existed in the U.S. well before the war broke out. One 
dimension of the fear traces back to the 19th century “yellow peril” scares in Hawaii and 
on the West Coast, which originated from fears of being “swamped” by Asian 
immigrants.33 The response of Europe and America to a rising Asian power that would 
re-order the world from its 19th-century imperialist empires was translated into a fear of 
Japanese espionage as the West discovered Japan to be an actual threat. Such fear 
culminated in the widespread belief that the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor on 7 
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December 1941 were the inevitable outcome of decades of systematic espionage. In fact, 
despite widespread pre-war U.S. fears of fifth column sabotage and espionage, such plans 
had never been in existence – Japanese intelligence agents played absolutely no role in 
the success of the Japanese offensive on Pearl Harbor. Although espionage could play a 
crucial role in executing effective military strategy and tactics, and it would seem that it 
was tactical military intelligence that underpinned Japan’s successful surprise attack on 
Pearl Harbor. Indeed the Japanese had only a few intelligence agents on U.S. soil – and 
the ones they had were completely useless.  
Historian Max Everest-Phillips argues that, “the secret history of facts, fears and 
fantasies of espionage shaped international ideological tensions and national rivalries 
between the great powers throughout the twentieth century.”34 Mere rumors and 
unreliable assumptions by the West concerning Japanese espionage served as the basis of 
international relations, and led to the shaping of an Anglo-U.S. security co-operation in 
Asia and the Pacific. Above all, it created an atmosphere of mutual distrust that 
ultimately helped lead to the war in 1941. 
Western belief in an orchestrated espionage campaign in the inter-war years arose 
from a dangerous mix of fears, misperceptions and facts known about (both) 
Japan and the real nature of its limited and fragmented espionage capability. The 
exaggerated ‘threat perception’ had many roots, from racial prejudice to the new 
threat to European and American interests in Asia and the Pacific precipitated by 
Japan’s sudden emergence as a major regional power.35 
 
The major threat that the West was anticipating from the Japanese was, in fact, an empty 
threat that had actually developed from cultural misunderstanding, misperceptions and 
the never-wavering prejudices the nations had already drawn about each other.  
 Five years before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt was already 
considering the potential imprisonment of certain Japanese aliens and citizens in a 
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concentration camp without due process. On 10 August 1936, Roosevelt wrote a 
memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations stating: 
One obvious thought occurs to me – that every Japanese citizen or non-citizen on 
the island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or has any connection with 
their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her 
name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a 
concentration camp in the event of trouble.36 
 
Then, in 1939 while the prospect of war was looming, Roosevelt directed the FBI to 
begin assembling a list of names identifying all aliens with “suspicious” backgrounds or 
activities that could be considered especially dangerous in the event of war. Accordingly, 
after the December 7th attack, the immediate arrests of aliens the FBI believed to be 
leaders and conspirators began. Most were adult male leaders in their community, who 
held positions as professionals, businessmen, doctors, and religious leaders. By 9 
December, more than 1,200 Issei men had been taken into FBI custody. While the initial 
roundup included virtually all of the male leadership of the Japanese American 
community, many were also powerless old men, as well as a couple of hundred elderly 
veterans.  
 The few months between Pearl Harbor and the signing of Executive Order 9066, 
which allowed special military powers, were critical in the decision process for mass 
evacuation and internment. During this “period of moderation,” a number of government 
officials were unsure of how to proceed, while others were adamant in their support for 
Japanese relocation. Ultimately, the decision was made to abandon moderation and seek 
internment. Under the influences of the “Yellow Fear,” which prompted a great worry 
about espionage and sabotage, and the issue of loyalty, there was immense popular 
support by the people of the West Coast for evacuation. Egged on by the media, which 
had an enormous influence over the general public in encouraging mass hatred for the 
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Japanese, the government leadership decided that evacuation was a precautionary 
“military necessity.” 
 As Japan’s victories continued throughout the Pacific, Japanese Americans living 
in the far-western United States were targeted for suspicion because they lived in an ideal 
location for communicating with the enemy. Many were convinced that the Japanese 
Americans would commit acts of sabotage or espionage, as rumors circled the nation 
about the so-called Fifth Column – an alleged network of Japanese Americans who 
conspired to aid Japan. This fear of the Fifth Column is documented in the following 
political cartoon by, of all people, Dr. Seuss, published in early 1942: 
 
Dr. Theodor Geisel Seuss, “Waiting for the signal from home…” PM Magazine 13 February 1942, cited from the 
website http://libraries.ucsd.edu/speccoll/dswenttowar/#ark:bb5222708w. 
However, a study conducted by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment 
of Civilians in 1982 reported, “all of this was done despite the fact that not a single 
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documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity was committed by an 
American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese alien on the West 
Coast.”37 Despite the widespread fear of the Fifth Column, it never actually existed, and 
not a single case of Japanese disloyalty or sabotage was recorded during the whole war. 
 The issue of Japanese American loyalty and where their allegiance lay was one of 
the largest factors in the decision to undertake mass internment. It was hard for the non-
Japanese people of America to understand the biculturalism of the Japanese American 
Nisei. As Americans, their allegiance belonged to their nation, but their racial ties to 
Japan were exclusively cultural. The Issei felt the same way, because although they were 
denied citizenship, they had chosen the United States as their home for the past few 
decades. Yet, the Japanese were still deemed untrustworthy, and it became necessary for 
all of them to prove their loyalty to the United States of America. In what he believed to 
be the best compromise, California’s Governor Culbert Olson explained to a group of 
Japanese American editors,  
You know, when I look out at a group of Americans of German or Italian descent, 
I can tell whether they are loyal or not. I can tell how they think… but it is 
impossible for me to do this with the inscrutable Orientals, and particularly the 
Japanese. Therefore, I want all of you present here to pledge yourselves to make a 
sacrifice for your country, the United States of America. Promise to give up your 
freedom, if necessary, in order to prove your loyalty.38 
 
 In terms of the total mass evacuation and internment of the Japanese, the public 
lent their popular support for the policy, while Californians were the most in favor of 
drastic action. Early in 1942, the Golden State’s entire congressional delegation, along 
with delegations from Oregon and Washington, began to lobby the federal government to 
take action against the Japanese Americans in their midst. “Most of this furor was 
inspired by patriotic panic seasoned by California’s long anti-Asian tradition and inter-
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ethnic animosity.”39 During January and early February 1942, key agricultural 
associations, business organizations, service clubs, and patriotic fraternities – motivated 
by racism, patriotism, military necessity, and economic greed – urged dire action. 
A stronghold of anti-Japanese American sentiment was Californian agriculture 
businesses, for whom “the Oriental had long been an enemy in the eyes of many 
Californians.”40 By 1940, the Japanese were producing 10 percent of the value of 
California farm products, which, in turn, led to an aggressive response from the non-
Japanese farmers. Farmers groups wanted to get rid of their competition and steal the 
valuable farmland from the Japanese by pushing hard for Japanese evacuation. They did 
not even attempt to hide their greedy intentions from the public as they campaigned for 
their cause. For instance, the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association admitted such in the 
Saturday Evening Post: 
We’ve been charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We 
might as well be honest. We do. It’s a question of whether the white man lives on 
the Pacific Coast or the brown man. They came into this valley to work, and they 
stayed to take over… If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we’d never miss 
them in two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce 
everything the Jap grows.41 
 
Greed and envy were the primary factors pushing agricultural producers to lobby for 
internment. 
 All of these factors, assisted by the heavy influence of the media, were 
instrumental in shaping minds and actions of the internment policy makers. General John 
L. DeWitt, Commander of the Western Defense Command and Fourth U.S. Army, was 
one of the key individuals involved in the decision for internment, and his ultimate 
recommendation for internment led to the issuing of Executive Order 9066. However, 
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DeWitt blew hot and cold in his stance on internment. One day he would give assurances 
that there was little threat of espionage or sabotage. The next he would be demanding the 
removal of all enemy aliens from his command. In early December 1941, he opposed the 
mass internment of Japanese Americans because, “an American citizen, after all, is an 
American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal 
out [from the] loyal and lock them up if necessary.”42 Yet, at a press conference about a 
year later, DeWitt infamously proclaimed “a Jap is a Jap, and it makes no difference if he 
is an American citizen.”43 Although he originally opposed mass internment, rising public 
opinion for Japanese removal and encouragement by other government and military 
officials who believed loyalty to be bound with ethnic identity turned DeWitt in support 
of internment.  
 Various government and military investigations were also conducted also 
conducted at this time to determine how dangerous the Japanese Americans actually 
were. The reports all seemed to draw the same general conclusion: that Japanese 
Americans as a group posed no threat. In a report submitted on 7 November 1941, 
exactly one month before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Curtis B. Munson, the State 
Department representative sent by Roosevelt to the West Coast, concluded: 
[T]here is no Japanese “problem” on the Coast. There will be no armed uprising 
of Japanese [in this country]… For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to 
the U.S. or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration 
camps or irresponsible mobs. We do not believe that they would be at least any 
more disloyal than any other racial group in the United States with whom we are 
at war.44 
 
Following the attack, in late January 1942, the Office of Naval Investigation estimated 
that only about 3,500 Japanese were potential military threats and stated that there was no 
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need for mass action to be taken against the Japanese.45 They found that the large 
majority of Japanese were at least passively loyal to the United States, a view summed up 
by Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Ringle of the Office of Naval Investigation this way: 
First, the West Coast Japanese were… increasingly Americanized and, like most 
immigrant groups, believed intensely in the United States and its vision of a better 
life. Second, in spite of their eagerness to be identified as Americans and their 
record of industry and responsibility, the Japanese on the West Coast were 
continually subjected to every sort of discrimination – discrimination as brutal 
and mindless as anything the South ever inflicted on the Negro.46 
 
Yet another investigation took place in January 1942, when the Justice 
Department caved into military pressure and agreed to stricter controls on enemy aliens – 
including spot raids on their homes. The FBI raided homes of Japanese residents, 
questioned them about their loyalty and searched for forbidden items. Attorney General 
Biddle reported the results of these raids to the president: 
We have not uncovered through these searches any dangerous persons that we 
could not otherwise know about. We have not found… any evidence that any 
[dynamite or gunpowder] was to be used in bombs… nor have we found any gun 
in any circumstances indicating that it was to be used in a manner helpful to our 
enemies. We have not found a camera which we have reason to believe was for 
use in espionage.47 
 
The investigations conducted in relation to potentially dangerous and disloyal Japanese 
Americans consistently concluded in groundless results, yet all of these were ignored by 
both military and government officials who continued to pursue an aggressive policy of 
relocation. 
 Even with the countless pieces of evidence suggesting Japanese American 
innocence and loyalty, political leaders, public opinion and the media worked together to 
turn the general public of America against the Japanese and to call for their removal. 
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During wartime in an American democracy, the safest approach for the government to 
take, in order to avoid upsetting the public and inciting protest, was to follow the strong 
theme of public opinion, while the military presented Japanese removal as a defense 
measure, a means to ensure the country’s protection. The media was very active in 
manipulating public sentiment. The San Francisco Chronicle was especially active in 
dehumanizing the Japanese through the articles of slander against them that it published. 
In an article bearing the provocative title “Japanazis or Japaryans,” published on 7 
January 1942, the Chronicle denounced the Japanese by “clarifying” the racial distinction 
between the Chinese and Japanese and by comparing the Japanese to Hitler’s Nazis: 
Our Chinese friends dislike to hear the Japanese referred to as “yellow”… They 
think of the word in its racial significance and remember that the yellow or 
Mongolian race includes many other peoples than the Japanese…. The point is 
well taken. And we do the Japanese to much honor by using for them a term 
which has been made honorable by the Chinese. Call them Japanazis if you 
please, or better still, Japaryans. That puts them where they belong, in Hitler’s 
pocket, but call them nothing that puts them in association with the honorable 
peoples of the yellow race.48 
 
Categorizing the Japanese together with the brutal Nazis, transformed them into another 
class of enemy figures intended to instill fear and terror into the hearts of the American 
public.  
One month later, on 21 February 1942, the San Francisco Chronicle published 
another article entitled “Facts Force America To Stop Pussyfooting.” It said its purpose 
was to get the public to realize that during wartime, in the fight for survival, it can be 
necessary to temporarily disregard civil rights for the greater good of country.  
The conclusion has been forced that whatever the personal exceptions, and there 
must be many, Japanese loyalty is primarily to Japan. We do not regard this as a 
reason to hate Japanese persons, foreign born or of immigrant extraction, who are 
among us. We would consider it nothing reprehensible if Americans born in Japan 
and who spent their lives there, and there are many such, remained at heart 
faithful to the United States in a war to the death…. It is a principle that persons 
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of Japanese blood who are loyal to the United States and its ideal can show that 
loyalty by recognizing necessity. This is a fight for survival. In this fight we 
cannot pussyfoot. We have to be tough, even if civil rights do take a beating for a 
time.49 
 
This article was clearly intended as a call to nationalism, especially with its odd notion 
that acceptance of internment would be a way for the Japanese Americans to prove their 
loyalty to the United States. 
 Walter Lippmann of the New York Herald-Tribune was another influential voice 
behind the anti-Japanese American movement. He favored evacuation for reasons of 
military defense and protection because he believed that the West Coast was a dangerous 
combat zone: 
…the Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and 
from without… It is [true]… that since the outbreak of the Japanese war there has 
been no important sabotage on the Pacific coast. From what we know about the 
fifth-column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to think, a sign that there is 
nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is held 
back until it can be struck with maximum effect…. I am sure I understand fully 
and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of 
mass evacuation and internment of all those who are technically enemy aliens. 
But I submit that Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific coast 
correctly…. The Pacific coast is officially a combat zone: some part of it may at 
any moment be a battlefield. Nobody’s constitutional rights include the right to 
reside and do business on a battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield 
who has no good reason for being there.50 
 
Lippmann put forth the same argument used by DeWitt and other policy makers, that the 
lack of evidence against Japanese espionage only proved that a certain type of well-
constructed and efficient sabotage was waiting in the shadows. The fact that absolutely 
no indication of Japanese sabotage was discovered did not clear the Japanese Americans 
of any suspicion; instead, it was a sign of the hidden and meticulously organized attack 
that would inevitably come. Lippmann also argued that the West Coast was already a 
combat zone, which allowed him to argue for Japanese evacuation in terms of military 
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defense preparedness. He emphasized that nobody had any reason for being on a 
battlefield if they had no good reason for being there, especially the suspicious and 
untrustworthy Japanese Americans.  
 The fear and uncertainty that began on December 7th was fueled further by 
pressure groups and racism, as well as by Japanese military victories in the Pacific. All of 
this heated public opinion, as did the media’s crusade against the Japanese Americans 
during the period of moderation. All these forces came together to work towards a sudden 
reversal of government policy. The decision to intern Japanese Americans, which came in 
mid-February, represented the failure of the government to adhere to civil liberties, to 
recognize and acknowledge the surmountable evidence in support of Japanese innocence, 
and to deter the control and influence of the media upon the public in dealing with such 
controversial matters of state. 
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“Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry”: The Evacuation 
“The right of every American to first-class citizenship is 
the most important issue of our time.” –Jackie Robinson 
 
 
On 19 February 1942, the “period of moderation” officially came to an end. On 
this historic date, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed and issued a US presidential 
executive order that authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe certain areas as military 
zones. Although the Executive Order was carefully composed as a generalization, and no 
specific mention of the Japanese was included in the document, it was issued at a time 
where the loyalties of all Japanese Americans were being questioned and the leaders of 
the nation were seriously considering pursuing a policy of Japanese mass evacuation. 
The target group of Executive Order 9066 was clearly the Japanese Americans, and, 
consequently, it was the first legal document issued by the government to clear the way 
for the mass deportation of the Japanese to relocation centers.51 
On 2 March 1942, General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1, announcing 
the creation of Military Areas No. 1 and No. 2 as a matter of military necessity. The two 
designated military areas covered the states of Washington, Oregon, California, and 
Arizona; within these areas were a number of further divisions of smaller local zones. In 
the press statement released by DeWitt on Public Proclamation No. 1, the general 
announced that the Japanese – both alien and citizen – would be the first group 
evacuated; only after all the Japanese were gone would the Germans and Italians then be 
evacuated as well. By formally declaring this first Proclamation as law, the US 
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government had taken its first step in enforcing its policy mass evacuation and 
relocation.52  
 Merely two weeks after Public Proclamation No. 1, DeWitt had already begun to 
usher the first act of civilian exclusion into motion. On 24 March 1942, Civilian 
Exclusion Order No. 1 of the Western Defense Command announced that he had 
commanded the following: 
all persons of Japanese ancestry, including aliens and non-aliens, be excluded 
from that portion of Military Area No. 1, described as “Bainbridge Island,” in the 
State of Washington, on or before 12 o’clock noon, P.W.T., of the 30th day of 
March 1942.53 
 
 
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1, Courtesy of the Manuscripts, Special Collections, University Archives Division, 
University of Washington Libraries, 24 March 1942. 
The island’s residents were allotted a mere six days to make arrangements and prepare to 
leave home for an undetermined length of time. On the morning of 30 March 1942, large 
army trucks lumbered up Island driveways to pick up family groups and transport them to 
the ferry “Kehloken,” which would then sail to Seattle and deliver them to a waiting 
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train. At the Seattle waterfront, hundreds of people crowded onto the ferry terminal’s 
overpass to witness the Japanese Islanders exit the ferry and be led to the waiting train. 
For many of the deportees, this was one of the most humiliating experiences they had 
ever been subjected to. As the initial site of wartime evacuation, Bainbridge Island had 
become the first place where relocation was successfully executed. The Japanese 
American internment had begun.54 
 After the Bainbridge Island exodus, DeWitt’s Civilian Exclusion Orders began to 
appear overnight on electric and telephone poles or placed in windows of public 
buildings throughout the West Coast. Generally, the Japanese were compliant and 
cooperative in following the rules and regulations spelled out by the Evacuation 
Instructions. It was common practice for most adults when they first received the 
shocking news of evacuation to react with the utmost practicality. An example of such 
can be seen in the seamlessly illustrated opening scene of Julie Otsuka’s novel, When The 
Emperor Was Divine. The Mother character discovers a sign when out on an errand, 
approaches it, reads and examines it from top to bottom, and then proceeds to take out a 
pen and piece of scrap paper in order to takes notes on what she needed to do.55 The 
glaring information in the evacuation notices was usually not taken as seriously by the 
children as it was by the “grown-ups” of their neighborhood and community. Usually, 
some of the older children would read the instructions to the younger ones, who did not 
understand the “big words” used in the text. In a 1998 interview recorded by the Densho 
Visual History Collection, Fumiko Uyeda Groves recalled the explanation of the 
evacuation order she was given by an older member of her neighborhood: 
Well, first of all one of the first things that was read to me was a curfew that we 
had to be in, we couldn’t be wandering around in the streets after [eight]. 
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Something like that. And then the other one was the evacuation. And those are 
two that were posted on the telephone poles. I remember that. And it all kind of 
happened very quickly. And so as soon as they were posted then people started 
either selling their, selling the goods out of their homes or trying to think of places 
to put their belongings because then it said that we would not be allowed, we’d 
only be able to carry one suitcase or something like that.56 
 
The household – a family or a person living alone – became the basic unit by 
which the Army organized the evacuees. One of the pertinent points highlighted by the 
evacuation notices was the instruction to all evacuees to send “a responsible member of 
each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the 
property is held, and each individual living alone”57 to the local civil control station. 
There, they were issued tags bearing their family number to be attached to each 
individual and to every piece of luggage in the family group. Although the evacuees were 
instructed to bring only what they could carry, they were ordered to carry with them 
bedding and linen for each member of the family, toilet articles, extra clothing, sufficient 
knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls, and cups for every member of the family.58   
 In an October 2006 interview for the Bainbridge Island Japanese American 
Community Collection, ex-evacuee Matsue Watanabe recounted her memories of 
registering as a young girl with her family for mass removal. Before the exclusion order, 
the FBI had already taken and locked away Watanabe’s father away, leaving her mother 
with no choice but to assume responsibility as the head of the family. When asked about 
that day her entire family went down to the local civil control station, Watanabe provided 
a brief description: 
Well, I, I do remember we had to go down to the Anderson Hardware and sign up 
for, for our numbers and, as a family. And, so we did do that. And there’s, of 
course a big sign up, up there telling us that that’s what we’re supposed to do. 
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And, and I suppose we came home with those little tags that we were to wear 
when we were taken away. But I just remember that building. And of course I’m 
accustomed to that building ‘cause the grocery store was right next to it. And we 
used to go into both the grocery store and Anderson Hardware and also the dry 
goods store which was across the street from there. So, that whole area is very 
familiar to me because I was the one that had to do the grocery shopping.59 
 
 During the evacuation process, an enormous problem presented itself to the 
government in the form of handling evacuee property. Problems of property disposal and 
protection prompted some of the most serious hardship faced by the Japanese, and would 
continue to haunt both the evacuees and the federal government for years to come. At the 
beginning of evacuation, some Japanese presumed that upon proper notice the 
government would pay the transportation costs of their personal belongings and 
equipment to the point of relocation. However, no official announcement was ever 
issued, and the government even received word from the Federal Reserve Bank that no 
such transportation costs would ever be paid. As a result, it appeared that the tactless 
United States government left the already unfortunate evacuees to deal with the 
relocation policy’s resulting property issues and complications by themselves.60  
 One of the major issues resulting from the strict regulations laid out by the 
evacuation policy was a serious number of losses in home, property, and possessions. 
Because the Japanese could only take what they could carry, they had to sell most of their 
personal and sentimental possessions. In the six days of preparation provided to them by 
the government, they had to part ways with items such as their family china and 
mementos, refrigerators, cars, furniture, radios, pianos, farms and houses. One evacuee 
recounted: 
It is difficult to describe the feeling of despair and humiliation experienced by all 
of us as we watched the Caucasians coming to look over our possessions and 
offering such nominal amounts knowing we had no recourse but to accept 
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whatever they were offering because we did not know what the future held for 
us.61 
 
Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston’s autobiographical memoir, Farewell To Manzanar, 
described the secondhand dealers as “wolves” who had been “prowling around for 
weeks… offering humiliating prices for goods and furniture they knew many of us would 
have to sell sooner or later.”62 On the day her family was leaving, one of the sleazy 
dealers approached Jeanne’s mother with an offer of fifteen dollars for a china set worth 
at least two hundred. She glared at the man with all her frustration and rage, and without 
a single word, she took out a dinner plate and hurled it to the ground right in front of his 
feet. While the man shouted at her about the value of her expensive dishes, “Mama took 
out another dinner plate and hurled it at the floor, then another and another, never 
moving, never opening her mouth, just quivering and glaring at the retreating dealer, with 
tears streaming down her cheeks.”63 Instead of succumbing to humiliation by desperately 
agreeing to a cheap little sum of money, Jeanne’s mother honored her pride by smashing 
her valuable china at the dealer’s feet. It was considered more honorable for the dishes to 
lay in pieces than in the hands of an unscrupulous merchant.  
 Fortunately, not all Japanese American evacuees were faced with the same awful 
fate as Jeanne and her mother regarding their property. A number of non-Japanese 
remained close friends and kindhearted neighbors to the Japanese throughout the war, 
and voluntarily worked hard to keep, maintain and preserve their friends’ belongings and 
property while they were away at camp. Houses were watched, possessions were 
safeguarded, and crops and fields were harvested – a sign that not all white Americans 
were filled with deep anti-Japanese sentiment. Perhaps one of the greatest Good 
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Samaritan examples was the idealistic young married couple from Bainbridge Island who 
owned the local newspaper and served as its coeditors and copublishers. Together, Walt 
and Milly Woodward spoke out against the exclusion and created a means through the 
printed word for the segregated Bainbridge Island internees to keep in touch with their 
community. Throughout the war, the Woodwards watched over the possessions of their 
Japanese friends and continued to speak out against the constitutional violations of the 
relocation policy. In fact, the local Bainbridge Review was nationally singled out as the 
lone newspaper to take such a stand. Because of the Woodwards’ indomitable efforts, 
many former internees chose to return to Bainbridge Island, and at a higher rate than was 
the case in most other communities. Walt Woodward, in a letter to his friend, Paul 
Ohtaki, wrote, “when this mess is all over, you people are going to want to come home. 
You’ll be welcomed with open arms by the vast majority of us.”64 Later, Paul penned his 
reflections into an essay, and concluded, “while we were making our plans for the 
evacuation…the Woodwards were…making plans [to] smooth our return home.”65  
You see, when American citizens of Japanese ancestry did return to their homes, 
many of them had to face flaming crosses at night, burned barns and ugly “No 
Japs Wanted Here” signs. None of that occurred on Bainbridge Island. Our Nisei 
came home to quiet welcomes and, as we all know, now are respected and 
integrated members of our community. So that certificate – and the American flag 
– belong to all our fellow Islanders.66 
 
 After the six hectic, chaotic and stress-filled days of preparation, the Japanese 
finally faced the dreaded arrival of “Evacuation Day.” On each appointed “evacuation 
day,” thousands of Japanese Americans gathered at designated locations, with the 
numbered identification tags they had been issued tied to their coats and luggage. In full 
view of the on-looking eyes of the curious non-Japanese public, they were met by armed 
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soldiers and transported in buses, private cars, and trains to sixteen temporary “assembly 
centers” throughout the states of California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona. Frank 
Miyamoto described how he felt on his “evacuation day,” from Seattle to the assembly 
center known as “Camp Harmony” at the Puyallup Fairgrounds. He said the evacuees felt 
that they were being herded like cattle and were being dispossessed. 
People were asked, well, required to assemble at certain places where they would 
be moved onto busses and so on. You’ve seen all these pictures of people, the 
evacuees, getting on busses to be shipped out of their community…. And it was 
kind of a feeling of people being… that we were cattle being herded together, to 
be herded out of the community. It was a feeling of – a very distressing feeling – 
of being forced out of our home, forced out of what was our due rights, to ship 
onto via busses, to God knows where. We didn’t know where we were going, 
what we were gonna’ have…. We were told we were being sent to Puyallup, but 
Puyallup was known simply as the fairground, we had no clear sense of what 
would be, what would meet us there. So the attitude I believe was one of… That 
point at which we were loaded on busses and shipped out, I think that was one of 
the worse points of our experience for us, in that we got the sense of being, as I 
say, herded like cattle out of our homes and where we felt we had a right to be.67 
 
 Yet, not all evacuation experiences were as painful. Frank Yamasaki was a 
teenager at the time of evacuation and was able to discern the irony and dark humor of 
the entire situation. He described his “evacuation day” from a different and more 
paradoxical perspective:  
There was a bus waiting there and they had military people in uniform and it was 
kind of ironical that when we got there, they were, we were just a few blocks 
away, so we just walked there and carried a suitcase – and it was almost like 
going out to a picnic. Everybody was dressed in their Sunday best. After all, 
either you wear your clothes or you throw it away. So they had their very best 
clothes on, and of course, all of a sudden you’re seeing all your friends and all 
your neighbors…. [With] everybody greeting each other and there was even 
laughter, and here we’re on the way to be incarcerated.68 
 
 Generally, adults feared the uncertainty of “evacuation day,” facing it with more 
anxiety and terror, while teenagers were able to create a more humorous situation. 
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Children innocently living in their perfect little worlds of ignorant bliss were not able to 
grasp the mature nature of the discrimination and evacuation they were being submitted 
to; they either cried or believed they were embarking on an exciting adventure. For 
Sumie Suguro Akizuki, a young Japanese American girl from the city of Bellevue, 
Washington, the train ride that her family took to their assembly center was a marvelous 
and special journey. She had always wished that someday she would get to ride a train.  
I looked up in awe as our school bus took us under the picturesque, historic 
railroad trestle each day. The irony is that my wish came true on May 20, 1942. 
The coal-driven locomotive, carrying all of the Japanese families from the East 
side of Lake Washington, crossed the trestle en route to our incarceration site.69  
 
Nobody on the train had any idea where they were going, and the men in charge refused 
to reveal their location. The journey took four days because they only travelled at night; 
during the day their train was put on sidetracks with the shades pulled down. They had 
absolutely no idea where they were until they finally arrived in central California at the 
Pinedale Assembly Center. Sumie was filled with disappointment at her destination, 
“What seemed like an adventure was not at all like I thought it would be. It was a time of 
sadness and uncertainty.”70 
 The children’s picture book by Yoshiko Uchida, The Bracelet, illustrates the 
entire evacuation experience through the eyes of the protagonist, a second-grade girl 
named Emi. On her “evacuation day,” Emi was old enough to understand that she was 
not being sent away on an adventure, and instead was terribly frightened. While waiting 
for the buses to take them away, Emi’s stomach jumped up and down. She wondered if 
everybody else was as scared as she was, especially of the armed soldiers assigned to 
guard the evacuees. “When she saw soldiers carrying guns with bayonets standing at 
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every doorway, she was so scared her knees began to wobble.”71 She was mature enough 
to understand the irreversible danger that guns represented and feared that the guards 
would shoot anyone attempting any kind of escape. 
 Although many children were alarmed by the armed guards surrounding them, 
there were occasional moments of goodwill between the soldiers and their child 
prisoners. Conceivably, the most notable experience was during the first evacuation from 
Bainbridge Island. Although quite young at the time, Frank Kitamoto was able to recall 
some memories of that day in an interview for the Densho Visual History Collection: 
But he [Frank] said by end, by the end of the time when they were marching us 
down from the dock to the ferry, he said most of the soldiers were crying… that 
they had tears in their eyes, and they were carrying kids. You can tell from the 
pictures they were carrying kids, because a lot of the mothers didn’t have fathers, 
their husbands with them, they were actually carrying the luggage and stuff for 
the kids down there. And some of the people who were in their early twenties and 
late teens at that time said that the soldiers actually, all the way down to 
California, actually led the group on the train in songs.72 
 
However, not all soldiers had the same bonding experiences with the Japanese 
American evacuees; kindness was a rare commodity. When Joseph Frisino, an old soldier 
assigned to guard the internment camps, was interviewed in 2000, he admitted that both 
he and the other soldiers yearned to shoot the Japanese Americans while ushering them 
into the camps. 
Here was a chance to maybe get into some action against some of these rotten 
people who have done this. But nothing really untoward happened. It was simply 
a matter of escorting these people in, but this one, one fellow was saying that he 
was, he was manning a machine gun on the, on the armored scout car, and was he 
saying, “I was just watching these people like a hawk, just hoping somebody 
would do something ‘cause I could fire.” And I mean, he was really gung-ho to 
fire into these people. And, when he said this, I had no feeling whatsoever of, 
“Why would you want to do that,” or anything. It just seemed, “Okay, that’s a, 
that’s a natural way to go, that, you want to hate somebody, if you want to have 
some revenge, why, this is the way to do it.” But it never, fortunately never 
happened. But I never, I never realized then that, the background of these, of these 
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people who were in these trucks. I mean, the Japanese Americans who were in the 
trucks. So that was my only encounter with that transportation situation. I’m 
certain that there wasn’t a man in the outfit who didn’t feel exactly like that 
fellow who was manning the machine gun, that given a chance, they’re gonna 
fire.73 
 
Rarely do studies of the Japanese American evacuation focus on the experiences of the 
soldiers assigned to guard the Japanese Americans in both the assembly centers and 
relocation centers. It may be that such reports are scarce because some of these men had 
violent thoughts of shooting the internees, regardless of their innocence or not. Why had 
the United States government made the decision to incarcerate over 110,000 innocent 
Japanese lives by reason of military necessity? They must be the enemy! It was a time of 
war. 
 In 1942, a brochure titled “Questions and Answers for Evacuees: Information 
Regarding the Relocation Program,” was issued by the War Relocation Authority to 
provide information clarifying the Evacuation and Relocation policy. Through a list of 71 
questions posed in the Q&A format, the WRA addressed every potential question it 
believed an evacuee could come up with while preparing for relocation. The first page of 
questions presents the opening topic, “Preparing For Relocation,” and begins with 
Question 1, “When I am evacuated, where will I go?” 
Answer: You will, most likely, first go to an Assembly Center, a temporary 
stopping place where you and your family will be provided with food, shelter, 
medical care, and protection until you leave for a Relocation Center, at which 
there will be permanent housing, work opportunities, educational facilities, and 
other essentials of a normal community. (In some areas evacuees will go directly 
from their homes to Relocation Centers.)74 
 
A common misconception of those unfamiliar with the entire Japanese American 
internment experience is that the Japanese Americans were rounded up and immediately 
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sent off to the internment camps. This is not true, for the relocation centers were far from 
ready when the civilian exclusion orders were issued and the people were rounded up. 
Relocation centers required some time for preparation and construction, and could not be 
accomplished as quickly as evacuation. Therefore, accommodations quickly had to be 
found to serve as temporary quarters while the longer-term settlements were being 
prepared. This was how the temporary, hastily contrived assembly centers came into 
existence. 
 On the final page of the WRA’s “Questions and Answers for Evacuees” pamphlet 
was a list of definitions to “keep in mind.” The first two seek to make the clear distinction 
between an “Assembly Center” and a “Relocation Center.” The WRA-approved 
definition given for “Assembly Center” was “a convenient gathering point, within the 
military area, where evacuees live temporarily while awaiting the opportunity for orderly, 
planned movement to a Relocation Center outside of the military area.”75 In contrast, the 
WRA defined a “Relocation Center” as “a pioneer community, with basic housing and 
protective services provided by the Federal Government, for occupancy by evacuees for 
the duration of the war.”76 Another definition included to “keep in mind,” was the term 
“Relocation Area,” which was “the entire area surrounding a Relocation Center, under 
the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority. The relocation lands are Federally 
owned, are designed as military areas, and are protected by military police.”77 
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Map of Assembly and Relocation Centers, Private family collection. 
 As early as 1942, General DeWitt stated that the “Assembly Center site selection 
was a task of relative simplicity,”78 and outlined what he believed to be its four 
fundamental requirements. First, it was necessary to locate “adaptable pre-existing 
facilities suitable for the establishment of shelter and the many needed community 
services.” Second, as there was no time for a long pre-development period, power, light, 
and water had to be within immediate availability. Third, the distance from the Center of 
to the evacuee population had to be short, the connecting road and rail net good, and the 
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potential capacity sufficient to accept the adjacent evacuee group. Finally, it was essential 
that there be “some area within the enclosure for recreation and allied activities as the 
necessary confinement would otherwise have been completely demoralizing.”79 Sixteen 
temporary assembly centers were hastily erected as living quarters, located throughout 
the West Coast in Washington, Oregon, Arizona and California. All were furnished with 
barbed-wire fences, guard towers and searchlights. 
 Eleven of the assembly centers were at racetracks or fairgrounds. Other places 
chosen included the Pacific International Livestock Exposition Facilities (Portland, 
Oregon), a former mill site (Pinedale, California), migrant worker camps (Marysville and 
Sacramento, California), and an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps Camp (Mayer, 
Arizona).80 Living conditions at the assembly centers were chaotic and squalid, especially 
as they were supplemented with army barracks. These barracks were originally designed 
for temporary use by combat soldiers, not large families with small children or elderly 
people. At the racetracks, stables had been hastily cleaned out before their use as living 
quarters, but the stench still remained. One former occupant recalled how,  
those stables just reeked. There was nothing you could do. The amount of lye they 
threw on it to clear the odor and stuff, it didn’t help. It still reeked of urine and 
horse manure. It was so disgusting for people to live in those conditions. It’s 
almost as if you’re not talking about the way Americans treated Americans.81  
 
Families were crowded into small quarters, usually only 20 ft by 20 ft. Privacy at the 
assembly centers was next to non-existent, as there were only communal lavatories and 
mess halls and thin walls in the barracks. As if those appalling conditions were not 
enough, there were also frequent shortages of food and other material. An appalling and 
disgusting lack of sanitation was another common feature that characterized these 
temporary WRA-approved “convenient gathering points.” 
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 Fortunately for the evacuees, it only took a few months to finish constructing the 
relocation centers. Once the Japanese Americans were finally freed of the deplorable 
conditions of the assembly centers, they no longer had to suffer through the abysmal 
extent of disgusting and inhumane conditions that their temporary stay at an assembly 
center provided them with. Although the relocation centers were far from hospitable, they 
were not of such low quality as the conditions at the assembly centers; in terms of health 
code violations, the evacuees had left the worst behind them. The Japanese endured the 
frustrations and inconveniences of the assembly centers for the most part peacefully and 
stoically because they knew those centers were only temporary and hoped for better 
treatment at their next location. The inherently traditional traits of strict discipline and 
quiet endurance were not only greatly honored by the Japanese, but were also used as a 
means for coping with their unfortunate situation. 
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Relocation, Internment, Confinement, Incarceration 
“I spent my boyhood behind the barbed wire fences of 
American internment camps and that part of my life is 
something that I wanted to share with more people. 
 -George Takei 
 
 
On 18 March 1942, President Roosevelt took a major step toward systematizing 
evacuation by signing Executive Order 9102 into law. This executive order established 
the War Relocation Authority (WRA); a civilian agency intended to supervise the 
evacuees after their departure from Army assembly centers.82 The WRA had been created 
with the purpose to “formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from 
[designated areas] of the persons or classes of persons designated…and for their 
relocation, maintenance, and supervision.”83 Its responsibility was to carry out the long-
range job of resettling or re-establishing the evacuated people and it initiated plans for 
establishing relocation centers “with sufficient capacity and facilities to handle the entire 
evacuated population for as long as might be necessary.”84 Once the evacuees stepped off 
the buses from the assembly centers, they left Army jurisdiction and came into the 
custody of this new agency, the War Relocation Authority. 
 In 1942, the War Relocation Authority published a booklet for its new employees 
and potential recruits, entitled “Your Job in WRA.” It opened with an idealized 
introduction of itself: “In joining the WRA, you have enlisted your services in an 
organization of men and women working toward the solution of a war problem unique in 
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the history of America.”85 It introduced itself as a great and noble organization of people 
working together to solve a problem. Despite describing itself as a government agency 
that has been “almost constantly on the battle front of public opinion since it was 
organized in the spring of 1942,”86 the WRA took a gentle and tolerant approach to the 
Japanese American relocation problem at hand. Instead of speaking of the dangers 
presented by the Japanese Americans in the way the Army had, the WRA presented itself 
as a benevolent organization: 
The War Relocation Authority was established primarily to relocate the people of 
Japanese descent – both citizen and alien – who were compelled by the exigencies 
of war to move from their homes in the Pacific Coast region during the spring of 
1942.87 
 
Through the organization’s distribution of this booklet and several other official 
publications over the war, the WRA offered the general public a positively constructed 
picture (with a slight propagandist nature) of the Japanese American relocation. 
 Much can be discovered through the documents of the WRA. In 1942, the agency 
distributed a restricted internal document “Prepared for Information of the Staff of the 
War Relocation Authority” to provide the “background for the relocation program” to its 
personnel. The document stated the fundamental policies and protocols of the 
organization in a calm and sympathetic voice. It described the WRA’s three major 
functions, with respect to the evacuees of Japanese ancestry as follows:  
(1) To provide them with an equitable substitute for the lives and homes given up; 
(2) to reestablish them as a productive segment of the American population; and 
(3) to facilitate their re-assimilation into the normal currents of American life.88  
 
The stated aim of the WRA was to make life at the relocation centers as close to the 
standard American view of normal as wartime exigencies would permit. All WRA staff 
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and personnel were expected to adhere to the policy that “cooperation, and not 
paternalism,”89 were to be the guiding principles of all relationships between staff 
members and the relocated people. The War Relocation Authority put great emphasis on 
the notion that “in every way, the evacuees should be made to feel that it is their 
community and that its ultimate success or failure depends largely on their efforts.”90 
However, “their” communities were to be organized in the accepted American style, and 
would subtly begin the Americanization of the Japanese internees. 
 One of the major functions of the War Relocation Authority was to re-assimilate 
the evacuees into American life. A set of regulations were established to allow the release 
of selected internees from the camps under controlled conditions, so as to re-establish as 
many of the evacuees as possible into a private American life outside the relocation 
centers. The regulations for early release came into effect on 1 October 1942, although 
they were most widely used in 1943 and especially in 1944. Considering the future of the 
Japanese Americans in a post-war period, the WRA aimed for their dispersion.  
If the American Japanese people are over to assume their rightful place in our 
national life, free of discriminations and animosities, an effort must be made 
during the war to prevent the formation of “Little Tokyos” in the future.91  
 
Because of the widespread public apprehension toward all people of Japanese ancestry at 
that time, it was necessary for the relocation of individual evacuees to proceed slowly and 
without attracting any publicity. Within the limits of national security and administrative 
convenience, the WRA worked through the war toward achieving the gradual emptying 
of relocation centers and the dispersal of those evacuees about whom there was no 
question of loyalty. The War Relocation Authority insisted that relocation centers should 
not be regarded as places of detention or confinement, but as “way-stations on the road to 
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individual relocation and re-assimilation into American life.”92 The WRA was 
determined to use the camps as a tool for the integration of Japanese Americans into 
American society. 
The relocation centers were designed to be self-contained American communities, 
complete with hospitals, post offices, schools, warehouses, offices, factories and 
residential areas, although also surrounded by barbed wire and guard towers. As the 
centers were intended to be as self-sufficient as possible, the residential core was 
surrounded by a large buffer zone that also served as farmland. The Military Police 
(MPs) had a separate living area adjacent to the relocation center in order to reduce 
fraternization. Civilian employees also had separate living quarters available to them at 
the camps as well. The layout of the ten relocation centers varied, but the major elements 
were all fairly consistent: in each, the perimeter was guarded by guard towers and barbed 
wire fences, there was generally a main entrance leading to the local highway and 
auxiliary routes to farming areas outside the central core.93 
 The relocation centers were located in isolated areas, most in deserts or swamps, 
primarily on unused or underutilized federal lands. All were in sparsely populated areas, 
which actually made them some of the largest “communities” in their respective states. 
The Tule Lake Relocation Center in California, the Minidoka Relocation Center in Idaho 
and the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in Wyoming were all located on undeveloped 
federal reclamation projects. Both the Jerome and Rohwer Relocation Centers in 
Arkansas were partially on land meant for subsistence homesteads under the Farm 
Security Administration. The Colorado River (Poston) and Gila River Relocation Centers 
in Arizona were both on Indian Reservations and opposed by the Tribal Councils on the 
grounds that they did not want to participate in inflicting the same type of injustice as 
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they had suffered, yet were overruled by the Army and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The 
Central Utah Relocation Center commonly known as Topaz had been part public domain, 
part county owned, and part privately owned. The Granada Relocation Center in 
Colorado had been privately owned and was purchased by the Army for the War 
Relocation Authority. And the Manzanar Relocation Center in California was located on 
unused land held by the City of Los Angeles for its water rights.94 
 The plans of the relocation centers were based on a grid system of blocks. Some 
non-residential areas, such as the administrative area, warehouses or hospital occupied 
more than a single block. The remainder of the central core was made up of residential 
blocks separated by empty fire breaks. Each residential block consisted of ten to fourteen 
barracks, a mess hall, latrines for men and women, a laundry and a recreation hall. 
Eventually, large sewage systems were built. The designs for the relocation centers were 
never intended to be permanent – instead, a set of standards and details were developed 
by the Army that modified the “theater of operations” type buildings to create suitable 
housing for women, children and elderly people while still meeting the requirements of 
quick construction, low cost, and restricted use of critical materials.95  
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Typical block plan, Private family collection. 
 The barracks at these centers followed standard plans, with different sized 
apartments to accommodate different-sized families and groups of single people. Each of 
the barracks had two apartments in each of the following sizes: 16 ft by 20 ft, 20 ft by 20 
ft and 24 ft by 20 ft. Each room had a heating unit, a single drop light, army cots, 
blankets and mattresses. Partitions between the apartments extended only to the eaves 
and left a gap between the walls and the roof, which created a great lack in privacy and 
little protection against the environment. The exterior walls and roofs of the barracks 
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were generally constructed by boards covered with tarpaper on frames of lumber and the 
raised floors were simply wooden boards, which quickly shrank and allowed dust and dirt 
to fly in all over the barracks.96  
In the beginning…every block looked exactly the same as every other block, 
‘cause they’re all lined up. And even if you got to the block, all the barracks were 
all exactly alike. Unless you knew which one you lived in, you could walk into 
somebody else’s.97 
 
 Recreation halls and community buildings were basically the same as the 
barracks, but were 20 ft by 100 ft and without interior partitions. Mess halls were 40 ft by 
100 ft and included a kitchen, store room and scullery. The block latrines and laundry 
facilities were three separate buildings in each residential block and had no toilet 
partitions, nor bathtubs, and very little hot water. Administration buildings were similar 
to the evacuee barracks, but had white clapboard exteriors rather than tarpaper. Staff 
housing was also equipped with the same exteriors and each unit was divided into self-
contained one, two or three bedroom apartments, each with its own kitchen and 
bathroom.98 
 Community buildings, such as schools and churches, were left to be constructed 
by the evacuees during their incarceration. Often entire blocks of barracks were devoted 
to schools, and the block recreation halls were usually converted to other general 
community purposes, such as churches or cooperative stores. These communal buildings 
that were later built and designed by the evacuees were often far more individualized than 
the rest of the camp barracks, and constructed of far more permanent materials. For 
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instance, the school buildings at Poston in Arizona were built from the widely-available 
local building material of adobe brick, made by the evacuees.99 
 The majority of food at all of the relocation centers was provided by local camp 
agricultural enterprises, with the surplus sent to the other centers Factories for the 
processing of agricultural products were common at all of the centers. Most of the centers 
had hog and chicken farms, and beef or dairy cows were even raised at Gila, Granada, 
Topaz and Manzanar. However, since it was a time of war, the relocation centers were 
also subject to the same rationing as the rest of the country. Victory Gardens 
supplemented the rations and evacuee crews recycled fats, metal, and other material 
considered vital to the war effort.100 
 The physical surroundings at the relocation centers had a great effect on everyday 
life. The identical blocks of flimsy barracks served as a reminder of the evacuees’ lack of 
freedom, but it was the guard towers, and especially the barbed wire fences, that 
delineated the difference between inside and outside the camps, between freedom and 
confinement. 
After the camp was built, thirty-six blocks of barracks, they put a five-strand 
barbed-wire fence all around the residential area of the camp. There were eight 
guard towers, one in each corner…. Each of them were occupied by an American 
soldier and a searchlight at night, and a rifle, or machine gun, I guess, with live 
ammunition. They guarded the camp by day and by night, and at night they would 
turn the searchlights on and whenever anybody opened the door of their barrack 
to go somewhere, go out, the searchlights would follow.101 
 
 The weather and harsh climate of the camps was another factor that had a major 
effect on the lives of the internees. The dust, mud, and extreme temperatures came as a 
great shock to the West Coast residents who were accustomed to more temperate 
climates. The dust was caused by the massive disturbance of soil produced from the 
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construction of hundreds of buildings at once. Eventually it did settle, but the harshness 
of the climate remained the same.102 
 Inter-generational tension was a major problem in the relocation centers, 
especially since the Issei and Nisei were such different generations. After Pearl Harbor, 
the balance of power shifted from the Issei to the Nisei, since most of the former Issei 
leadership was arrested on suspicion of espionage and collaboration; in their absence, the 
Nisei inherited their power and influence, both within the family and in general. Once the 
camps had been set up, most of the Issei were released to reunite with their families in the 
centers. However, many Issei did not speak English, or were not very fluent, but the use 
of the Japanese language was restricted; all meetings had to be conducted in English, and 
all newsletters and other publications were in English as well. Originally, the relocation 
center directors appointed block leaders from among the internees. But the War 
Relocation Authority decided that the Nisei should participate in governing their own 
communities as much as possible. WRA policy called for a community council with one 
elected representative from each block, an executive committee and a judicial committee. 
Issei were not eligible to hold an elective office.103  
 Life in the camps began every day with a siren blast at 7:00 a.m., and an 
American style breakfast served in the mess halls. Work began at 8:00 for the adults, 
while school began at 8:30 or 9:00 for the children. Camp life was highly regimented and 
filled with a constant rush to beat other groups to the large communal areas, such as the 
lavatories and mess halls for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Camp lifestyle required drastic 
transformations in routine and outlook, as described by a former evacuee: 
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When a human being is placed in captivity, survival is the key. We develop a very 
negative attitude toward authority. We spent countless hours to defy or beat the 
system. Our minds started to function like any POW or convicted criminal.104 
 
Living in a relocation center meant waiting to see what would happen next, as 
there was no way to prepare for the future. Personal choices and preferences were denied, 
such as the choice of where to live or what to eat. There was little reason to work, except 
to pass the time or to fill immediate community needs. Merely surviving was both 
physically and psychically draining, and holding a family together without privacy or 
authority required a full commitment. The best option for internees was to attempt to 
create and establish the illusion of a normal functioning community, with normal 
pastimes, as the camps had become busy places. We might see here a manifestation of the 
Japanese ability to make do in difficult circumstances – an ability captured in the phrase 
the Japanese used when something difficult must be endured: “Shikata ga nai,” or “it 
cannot be helped.”105  
 When the evacuees arrived at the relocation centers, the “education program” was 
little more than a promise by the WRA that schools would be the first order of business. 
Since school buildings and equipment had not been part of the original construction of 
the camps, classes were first held in large barrack-like recreation halls and began later in 
the year than usual, between 1942 and January 1943. In its report for October-31 
December 1942, the WRA described the conditions of the schools: 
With no exceptions, schools at the centers opened in unpartitioned barracks meant 
for other purposes and generally bare of furniture. Sometimes the teacher had a 
desk and chair; more often she had only a chair. In the first few weeks many of 
the children had no desks or chairs and for the most part were obliged to sit on the 
floor – or stand up all day…. By the [end of 1942]… it was no longer necessary 
for many pupils to sit on the floor, but seating was frequently of a rudimentary 
character. Text books and other supplies were gradually arriving. Laboratory and 
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shop equipment and facilities, however, were still lacking. No center had been 
able to obtain its full quota of teachers.106 
 
Recruiting and training teachers was a constant problem as well. Few evacuees were 
certified to teach and it was difficult to recruit outside teachers because of the centers’ 
harsh living conditions, amongst other things. As a result, many evacuees with two or 
more years of college became “assistant teachers,” and in some cases assumed a full 
teaching load. 
 Schooling was provided at four different levels: nursery school, elementary 
school, high school and adult education. The War Relocation Authority designed a core 
curriculum set in consultation with the state education authorities where the center was 
located, and was consistent with the recognized standards of the state. “Education for 
Relocation and a Broader Participation” was the central theme in the foundation of the 
curriculum, whose chief aims were to study the democratic ideal and to discover its many 
implications. The goal was to Americanize camp residents through the curriculum, which 
was designed to “promote an understanding of American ideals; loyalty to American 
institutions and training for the responsibilities of citizenship and of family; and for 
economic independence both on the project and in the communities to which the student 
might return.”107 
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WRA,Topaz Utah, Photographer unknown, July 1945. 
 In the first months of relocation, equipment was minimal and the recreation halls 
were often used for purposes other than recreation. However, by the winter of 1942, 
conditions were improving in all the camps, and recreational activities began to flourish. 
Athletics was one of the major recreations, with baseball as the most popular sport. At 
some centers, there were as many as 100 teams active at one time, ranging from children 
to Issei in their sixties.108 Indoor sports were limited to ones that occupied little space, 
such as ping-pong, judo, boxing and badminton. Sumo wrestling was also available to 
those interested in the traditional sports of Japan. At some camps, swimming pools were 
eventually dug out by the internees so they could enjoy some cool relief during the 
sweltering hot summers. At Poston, Setsuko Kawashiri recalled,  
There was a lot of talent and time in the community. They volunteered to build a 
swimming pool using a section of the irrigation canal. Boy, did we make use of 
that! That’s where I learned how to do the “deadman’s float.”109 
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 Aside from athletics, the evacuees also diverted themselves with dancing, plays, 
concerts, and games like cards, chess, checkers, Goh, Shogi, and Mah-jongg. Numerous 
arts and crafts exhibitions and films were presented in each mess hall and an outdoor 
theater (a walk-in rather than a drive-in because there were no cars) was even built at 
Manzanar, where evacuees had the chance to view the most current films. Music 
flourished, although the camps had few instruments. There were not one but two 
orchestras at Topaz, and a variety of dance classes were offered, which included tap, 
ballet, toe and Oriental.110 
   
A dance at the Heart Mountain high school gymnasium in the Fall of 1943 by WRA photographer Hikaru Carl 
Iwasaki, Fall 1943111 
 
 
The splash of a diver can be seen in Heart Mountain’s swimming hole, dug by prisoners in late July 1943, by Bill 
Manbo, July 1943. 
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 Most of the relocation centers were equipped with English-language libraries, 
which continued to grow and expand their branches throughout the entire internment 
period. By the end of 1943, as the government’s treatment of Japanese Americans 
became more lax after the US began scoring military victories in the war in the Pacific, 
most of the libraries had established Japanese-language sections as well.112  
 One of the War Relocation Authority’s chief priorities in Americanization was to 
foster the growth and formation of normal American communities within the camps. 
Therefore, the WRA enthusiastically encouraged the establishment of local chapters of 
national American organizations. By the end of 1942, most centers had established 
chapters of the American Red Cross, YMCA and YWCA, and Boy Scouts and Girl 
Scouts. The usual philanthropic events of scrap metal drives, bond sales, Red Cross 
drives, and blood donations were held as fundraisers by the relocation centers’ local 
chapters. Ultimately, these organizations, particularly the YMCA and YWCA, became 
quite active in helping evacuees to resettle after the war. The WRA’s policy of 
“Americanization” was the most effective on the Nisei generation, especially with the 
younger children. Through their eyes, the irrefutable attraction of the American lifestyle 
was clear. John Tateishi, a former childhood evacuee, recalled: 
In some ways, I suppose, my life was not too different from a lot of kids in 
America between the years 1942 and 1945. I spent a good part of my time playing 
with my brothers and friends, learned to shoot marbles, watched sandlot baseball 
and envied the older kids who wore Boy Scout uniforms. We shared with the rest 
of America the same movies, screen heroes and listened to the same heartrending 
songs of the forties. We imported much of America into the camps because, after 
all, we were Americans. Through imitation of my brothers, who attended grade 
school within the camp, I learned the salute to the flag by the time I was five years 
old.113 
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A Boy Scout, and behind him a drum majorette, at the head of a parade, by Bill Manbo.114 
 
Despite the process of Americanization, for many Nisei children interned during 
the war, the camp experience disrupted their childhood and shook their perceptions of 
themselves as American children. Classified by the country of their birth as 
untrustworthy “foreigners” and “Japs,” these children were interned at a pivotal time in 
their development, and began to question and reconsider their own identities. The mass 
uprooting of evacuation and the incarceration behind barbed wire radically shaped the 
young Japanese American children’s easily influenced perspectives on both themselves 
and on their ways of acting on the world.  
We were the children of the camps, prisoners in our own country…. While the 
 rest of America remembers those years of World War II with a sense of pride and 
 nostalgia for a glorious past, for us, the kids of the camps, the experience was 
 very, very different.115  
 
Photographs taken by Bill Manbo of young people interned at the Heart Mountain 
Relocation Center offer vivid and poignant images of life in the camps. In them, one can 
see the mixture of Americanizaed and yet disrupted and imprisoned childhoods 
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experienced by many young Japanese Americans. Several of the photos show Manbo’s 
young son Billy, like the one below:  
 
Billy Manbo Clutches a Barbed-Wire Fence, by Bill Manbo, 
All photographs by Billy Manbo from Eric L. Muller, the editor of Colors of 
Confinement: Rare Kodachrome Photographs of Japanese American Incarceration in 
World War II.116 
 
 
Billy Manbo Walks Westward Along an Avenue in the Camp Lined with Piles of 
Coal for the Stoves in the Barracks, by Bill Manbo,  
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Although many of the children were too young to understand the real meaning of 
the evacuation and imprisonment, or to feel the full impact of the Japanese American 
situation, they did not live in complete ignorance. In April 1942, ten-year-old Roy S. 
Tsuboi was working as a crossing guard for his Junior Safety Patrol when suddenly, out 
of nowhere, an old man charged at him spewing the words, “Dirty Jap!” Grabbing Roy 
by the collar, he stopped a motorist by yelling, “Take this Jap boy to the nearest police 
station – I’m making a citizen’s arrest.”117 Memoirs of those interned as children show a 
strong sense of what John Y. Tateishi called, “America’s racism against us.” He says he 
was aware as a child of “white America’s hatred of me because of my ancestry, the fact 
that even as a child I was viewed with diminished humanity.”118 Tateishi sums up what 
he learned as a child this way: 
 I learned that life is not parceled out equally, sometimes despite what you are but 
too often because of the way you look or the way you think. I knew (and I can 
distinctly remember being aware of this) that my confinement was because I was 
Japanese. I knew, even at the early age of three or four, that I was different from 
the men who stood in the towers, different from the white faces that stared 
curiously at the camp and at us from the cars that passed by on the distant 
highway.119 
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Innocent Babies (Nisei), by Henry Sugimoto, no date.120 
From the first days of their internment up until the camps were closed, the 
Japanese internees attempted to create a sense of normalcy through the reconstruction of 
everyday life. As the months and then years went by within the camps, they grew and 
developed into what amounted to be totally equipped American small towns. This was 
especially vital for the developing lives of the children, many of whom were condemned 
to spend their critical years of development growing up behind barbed wire. 
   
A Pickup Baseball Game at Dust (left) and Billy Manbo Practices Ice-Skating (right), by Bill Manbo. 
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Some children even began to devalue their Japanese heritage, as the many efforts 
to recreate a “normal” life for the children in the camps and the effects of internment 
mainly strengthened the children’s sense of identity as Americans precisely because it 
denigrated their identity as Japanese.  
The fact that America had accused us, or excluded us, or imprisoned us, or 
whatever it might be called, did not change the kind of world we wanted. Most of 
us were born in this country; we had no other models.121 
 
As a child of the camps, Jeanne Wakatsuki (the author behind the memoir Farewell to 
Manzanar) was young and impressionable enough to find it easier to accept the negative 
stereotypes of the Japanese and strive to embody the model of a typical “American” life 
than to create her own bi-cultural model. 
The compulsory evacuation, relocation and incarceration of the Japanese 
American community forced them to confront their feelings of loyalty. Many Nisei had 
supported the United States as loyal and patriotic citizens, until their government decided 
that they were untrustworthy and guilty until proven innocent. Some merely began to 
sympathize with the Japanese government, but in a few extreme cases, feelings of 
American betrayal caused formerly loyal citizens to renounce their citizenship. Yet, it 
was the most difficult for the Issei, who had been classified as “enemy aliens,” and even 
though they also felt American, often still had feelings of loyalty to the Japanese nation 
of their birth. A large majority of Japanese Americans remained who continued to feel 
loyal to their country, even though they had lost their homes and freedom, and sought 
ways to prove their loyalty to the outside world. 
 One of the policies of the War Relocation Authority was to determine which 
evacuees were actually loyal to the United States, and then to find places for them to 
work and settle away from the West Coast and outside of the relocation centers. Initially, 
                                                
121 Houston, Farewell, 100. 
 69 
each case had to be investigated individually, which often took months at a time, as each 
person had to find a job and place to live while simultaneously convincing the 
government that he or she was not a threat. Eventually, in order to streamline the process, 
every adult evacuee was given a questionnaire entitled “Application for Indefinite Leave 
Clearance.” However, these questionnaires had originally been intended for determining 
the loyalty of possible conscripts into the armed forces, and were tactlessly left 
unmodified for the general population, which included women and Japanese citizens.122 
An account of this questionnaire summarized the most famous controversial questions, 
which were Numbers 27 and 28: 
Question 27 asked draft-age males: Are you willing to serve in the armed forces 
of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered? 
Question 28 was the loyalty question: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to 
the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or 
all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or 
obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or 
organization?123 
 
 While the first question was relatively straightforward, despite being written for 
draft-age men, it was the ambiguity of the second question that was particularly 
inappropriate. For the Issei, who were not even allowed to become American citizens, 
saying yes would effectively leave them without a country. For some others who had 
already felt loyal to the United States, it appeared to be a trick question. No one was sure 
what the consequences would be, and were certainly not prepared for it. However, it 
became one of the most divisive issues of the entire wartime relocation.  
 While some of the “no-nos” (those who had answered “no” to both questions) 
were truly more loyal to Japan than to the United States, there were many cases where 
people answered “no” as a compromise to keep families together. Others answered “no” 
as a way of protesting the injustice of the entire relocation rather than suggesting loyalty 
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to Japan. Alternatively, there were some who did not want to imply that they expressed 
interest in applying for leave, since they were already settled in the relocation centers, 
which they considered to be a safe haven, and did not want to find themselves forced out 
into the unknown. Those who answered “yes” to the loyalty questionnaire were eligible 
to leave the relocation centers, but only if they found a sponsor.  
Through this complicated leave process, the overall population of the relocation 
centers was gradually reduced, and it seemed that the relocation program was working. 
Over 18,000 evacuees moved out of the relocation centers in 1944, and by the end of the 
war over 50,000 Japanese Americans had relocated to the eastern United States.124 
 For the “no-nos” of the camps, the WRA created a new category, labeling them as 
“disloyals,” to be segregated from the “loyals.” As the Tule Lake Relocation Center in 
California already housed the highest number of disloyals, the WRA determined that it 
should become the new segregation center.125 Thus, in 1943, the Tule Lake War 
Relocation Center was converted into a high security Segregation Center to house the 
disloyal. Within just a few months, the population at Tule Lake rose from 15,276 to 
18,789. Additional barracks had to be built, and the camp was expanded so that it actually 
housed almost 4,000 more people than its originally intended capacity. However, such a 
high concentration of incarcerated Japanese Americans created discontent, which grew as 
security increased and additional soldiers were assigned to the camp. A seven foot high 
chain link fence topped with barbed wire was rapidly added, Army tanks arrived on site, 
and the number of guard towers surrounding the center was increased from 6 to 28. The 
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neighboring farm areas were also surrounded by a warning fence, a security fence and 16 
new guard towers.126 
 As a segregation center, Tule Lake was a mix of some “loyals” with no intention 
of leaving the United States, pro-Japan Japanese Americans who wished to repatriate or 
expatriate as soon as possible, and many whose feelings fell somewhere between those 
two extremes. Internal friction between loyal and disloyal groups, as well as with the U.S. 
Army, resulted in harassment, beatings, riots, mass demonstrations, military intervention, 
and occupation. Thus, as discontent grew within the Segregation Center, the Army took 
control of the camp in late 1943 by declaring martial law on 13 November, which lasted 
until 15 January 1944.127 
 In 1944, while under martial law, the stockade area was established. It consisted 
of a 250 ft by 350 ft area enclosed by fences and guard towers. Within the stockade were 
four barracks, a mess hall, a latrine and Army tents that were used as unheated 
punishment quarters for some stockade prisoners. To the north of the stockade stood the 
six cell concrete jail designed to imprison up to 24 men, but at its peak, over 100 men 
were incarcerated there.128 
 As an unfortunate circumstance of the government’s relatively new pursuit to 
form an all-Nisei fighting unit and determine the eligibility of the men by means of 
issuing the loyalty questionnaire, the loyalty program had escalated into one of the most 
divisive events of the entire camp history. It broke apart the community of evacuees by 
forcing each to make a clear choice on their very uncertain future. It was an incredibly 
difficult issue to make a decision on, as it not only physically divided families and 
friends, but also divided them philosophically, morally, and emotionally. The internees 
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had a choice to make – between the United States of America and their new adjusted 
American lifestyles of their camps, or with the Empire of Japan and the grim confinement 
awaiting all “disloyals” at Tule Lake Segregation Center. 
 
 
  
 73 
 
Hawaii: A Relative Island Paradise of Interracial Interactions 
“Aloha ‘oe, aloha ‘oe 
E ke onaona noho i ka lipo 
One fond embrace, 
A ho’i a’e au 
Until we meet again” 
-Aloha ‘Oe (Farewell to Thee) Composed by Queen 
Liliuokalani 
 
 
By the time of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, there were already nearly 158,000 
persons of Japanese ancestry living in Hawaii – more than 35 percent of the 
population.129 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Hawaii experienced a large 
influx of immigration from Japan and other various East Asian nations in the Pacific. 
Between 1885 and 1894, 28,691 Japanese contract laborers migrated to Hawaii, with 
most deciding to remain in the islands after completing their contracts. Japanese 
businessmen immigrated over in the 1890’s as well, and they eventually established 
themselves as leaders of the emerging Japanese community in Hawaii. By 1910, one-
fourth of the Japanese in Hawaii were native-born; and by 1940, nearly three-fourths of 
the ethnic Japanese population was native-born. By the outbreak of World War II, Nisei 
were becoming integrated into the Hawaiian economy, earning places in the municipal 
and territorial government, becoming schoolteachers and administrators, practicing law 
and medicine and working in businesses owned by the old haole (white) families.130 
 Hawaii was much more ethnically mixed and racially tolerant than the West 
Coast, as race relations in Hawaii before the war were not infected with the same vicious 
longtime antagonisms and anti-Asian agitation that existed on the mainland. But that does 
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not mean that there were not any discriminatory anti-Asian prejudices in the territory. 
Certainly, interethnic tensions did exist between the various ethnic groups in Hawaii, but 
the degree of racial hostility and legal, political, and economic exclusion was 
considerably less than that on the mainland. In fact, there were many instances of positive 
social interrelationships between the Japanese and members of the other ethnic groups in 
Hawaii. Through these interpersonal relationships, the islanders came to develop a strong 
basis of interethnic understanding and trust for one another. “In Hawaii, the spirit of 
aloha prevailed, and white supremacy never gained legal recognition.”131 Lastly, able 
leaders in the haole community wanted cooperation with the Japanese American 
community. Hawaii had a “group of influential individuals who were knowledgeable 
about the Japanese and were careful to treat persons as individuals rather than subjecting 
them to collective suspicion and fearful attitudes on the basis of their ethnicity.”132  
 At 11:30 in the morning of December 7th, only a few hours after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the Territorial Governor, Joseph Poindexter, issued a proclamation 
invoking the powers conferred on him by the legislature under the Hawaii Defense Act of 
1941; this law gave the governor extraordinary, virtually dictatorial, wartime powers but 
kept control of the Hawaiian Islands in civilian hands. But then at 3:30 p.m. the same 
day, Poindexter issued another proclamation that placed the Territory of Hawaii under 
martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Although such a 
drastic declaration would seemingly be a complete and outrageous violation of the law, it 
was entirely legal. The 1900 Hawaiian Organic Act explicitly gave the governor that 
right, and many others in the event of an emergency. According to Section 67 of the Act: 
The governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the 
United States and of the Territory of Hawaii… and he may in case of rebellion or 
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invasion or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, suspend 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the territory or any part thereof 
under martial law until communication can be had with the president and his 
decision thereon made known.133 
 
As can be expected, President Roosevelt immediately authorized Poindexter’s suspension 
of habeas corpus and the imposition of martial law. However, in his proclamation the 
governor not only proclaimed martial law, which in itself suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus, but also requested the Commanding General of the Army’s Hawaiian Department 
to exercise all governmental functions normally exercised by the governor “during the 
present emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed [as well as] to exercise the 
powers normally exercised by judicial officers and employees of this territory.…”134  
 In a simultaneous proclamation, the Commanding General, Lieutenant General 
Walter C. Short, declared himself the “Military Governor” of Hawaii and took charge of 
the government of the Territory. In his proclamation, he made his intentions clear: 
In order to assist in repelling the threatened invasion of our island home, good 
citizens will cheerfully obey this proclamation and the ordinances to be published; 
others will be required to do so. Offenders will be severely punished by military 
tribunals or will be held in custody until such time as the civil courts are able to 
function.135 
 
Thus the entire civilian population of the Hawaiian Islands was placed under the control 
of a military governor whose discretionary powers were absolute. However, after only a 
few short days, on 17 December 1941, General Short was removed from command of the 
US Army’s Hawaiian Department as part of an effort to find someone to blame for the 
disaster of the Japanese attack on Hawaii. Short, along with the Navy Commander in 
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Chief, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, became scapegoats of the military; both were 
accused of being unprepared and charged with dereliction of duty.136 
 One of the first official acts of the Military Government was to move into Iolani 
Palace and take over the office of the attorney general. From the elegant comfort of the 
old royal Hawaiian palace, the Military Governor ruled with “authority over business 
deals, labor disputes, police, transportation, [and] daily movement of citizens.”137 
Hundreds of general orders were issued under the name of the Commanding General, 
affecting virtually every aspect of civilian life. 
 Among some of the most intrusive incursions on freedom were a curfew and 
blackout instituted on the evening of 7 December. The curfew began at eight p.m. and the 
blackout was total, as it prohibited the showing of any lights between the hours of 
sundown and sunrise and forbade any civilians to be out on the streets during blackout 
hours. The Army censored the press (and temporarily closed Japanese language 
newspapers), radio broadcasts and transmissions, long-distance telephone calls and 
cables, and all civilian mail. They permanently closed all Japanese-language schools and 
temporarily closed the public schools, allowing them to reopen two months later with a 
four-day week so children could work in plantation fields. Hospitals and emergency 
facilities were under direct Army control, as were food and liquor sales, parking and 
traffic, and prostitution. The Office of the Military Governor also assumed control of the 
agencies that regulated war production, labor, and price administration. The Army’s 
control of labor included wages, working conditions and allocations of workers to 
industries and firms, which left nearly half the workers frozen in their jobs, with stiff 
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penalties for absenteeism or switching jobs without permission.138 The registration and 
fingerprinting of all civilians on Oahu over the age of six was ordered on 27 December 
1941, and in March 1942 the order was extended to include the other islands as well. All 
residents of Hawaii were required to carry identification cards on their person at all 
times.139 
 Additional restrictions were specifically directed at enemy aliens, chiefly the 
Japanese. No Japanese alien could travel by air, change residence or occupation, or 
otherwise travel from place to place without the approval of the Provost Marshal General. 
Nor could they buy or sell liquor, be at large during the blackout, assemble in groups 
exceeding ten persons, or be employed in restricted areas without permission. On 8 
December, aliens were required to turn in firearms, explosives, cameras, shortwave 
receivers, and other items that could be used in espionage. Concern about aliens 
possessing firearms apparently persisted, for two months later, all American citizens of 
Japanese, German, and Italian ancestry were ordered to turn in firearms, explosives, 
ammunition, and weapons.140 Certain areas of Oahu were ruled off-limits to Japanese 
aliens, forcing many to leave their homes and businesses; many farmers suffered heavy 
losses when they had to evacuate their property. Japanese fishermen were forbidden to go 
to sea lest they commit espionage, and many Japanese Americans lost their jobs. They 
were also soon excluded from the Hawaii Territorial Guard and the Nisei already serving 
in the army were segregated and shipped to the mainland.141 
 The military governor’s office included an alien property controller, public 
relations department, personnel, finance, and morale sections. Divisions were also created 
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to handle priorities like civilian defense, food control, labor control, materials and 
supplies control, cargo and passenger control, land transportation control, cold storage 
control and cloth control.142 The Military Governor maintained a public relations section 
“consisting of a staff of four civilians whose duty it was to give out press releases which 
were designed to place the military government in a favorable light and to suppress news 
reflecting dissatisfaction with the regime.”143 
Perhaps one of the worst situations under martial law was the Army’s control of 
judicial functions.  
In place of the criminal courts of this Territory there have been erected on all the 
islands provost courts and military commissions for the trial of all manner of 
offenses from the smallest misdemeanor to crimes carrying the death penalty.144 
 
For more than three years, these provost courts remained the principal institutions of 
justice in Hawaii. Civilians brought before them were denied virtually all of the basic 
constitutional guarantees of due process contained in the Bill of Rights, including the 
right to trial by jury and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures without a 
warrant. Often no written charges were presented and defendants were not permitted to 
cross-examine witnesses against them, nor to call witnesses in their own behalf. Many of 
the judges did not have legal training, and, although defendants were formally allowed 
the right to counsel, the provost judges commonly told them that lawyers were neither 
necessary nor desirable.145 
Heavy fines and long prison sentences are meted out in many cases for 
comparatively trivial violations of military orders…. In some instances persons 
have been found guilty of violating “the spirit of martial law” or “the spirit” of 
general orders, notwithstanding the act for which they are charged is not 
prohibited either by statute or military order.146 
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 These trials were among the worst features of the military takeover of the civilian 
government in Hawaii. The average trial in provost courts took five minutes or less, and 
of the 22,480 trials conducted in Honolulu’s provost court in 1942-43, some 99 percent 
resulted in convictions. Several hundred individuals were sentenced to prison, and at least 
two hundred of them for terms between six months and life; in the first eight months of 
the war alone, fines totaling more than $500,000 were imposed upon convicted civilians. 
The provost courts seemed to especially embrace their reputation for being unfair, 
unjudicial, and unmilitary by making no distinction between juveniles and adults – 
defendants as young as fourteen years of age were even tried by provost judges! One 
federal district court judge in Hawaii summarized the entire situation quite bluntly, 
characterizing the military regime in Hawaii as simply “the antithesis of 
Americanism.”147 
 Every general order delivered during martial law in Hawaii involved a criminal 
sanction, which was apparently quite typical in terms of military standards. The problem 
here was the fact that military concepts were being applied to civilians, for whom 
criminal law only played a small part in their affairs. “The military system, however, 
[was] predicated upon a penal sanction attaching to every order even of the most trivial 
character.”148  
 Shortly after the backlash of Pearl Harbor had forced General Short to retire in 
disgrace, General Delos Emmons assumed the position of Commanding General in 
Hawaii. He had views very different from disgraced General Short. Emmons appears to 
have argued quietly and consistently for a policy in favor of the Issei and Nisei of the 
United States. He held up plans to take radical measures against the local Japanese 
population by raising practical problems about labor shortages and transportation, and 
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this allowed the pressure to evacuate the Japanese from the Hawaiian Islands to subside. 
On 21 December 1941, in his first radio address to the public as Military Governor and 
Commander of the Hawaiian Department, General Emmons assured the diverse Hawaiian 
public that there was little to no likelihood of any actual case of sabotage. From there, he 
also sought to personally address and reassure the Japanese American community that the 
authorities would not take general action against them: 
There is no intention or desire on the part of the federal authorities to operate 
mass concentration camps. No person, be he citizen or alien, need worry, 
provided he is not connected with subversive elements…. While we have been 
subjected to a serious attack by a ruthless and treacherous enemy, we must 
remember that this is America and we must do things the American Way. We 
must distinguish between loyalty and disloyalty among our people.149 
 
 Immediately after Pearl Harbor, instructions had been given to watch the Japanese 
in Hawaii carefully. The Navy had insisted on the removal of all Japanese from Hawaii to 
protect itself against sabotage. And so, plans were made either to deport the Japanese to 
the mainland, ship them to one of Hawaii’s smaller islands, or place them in camps on 
Oahu. On 10 January 1942, the War Department sent an inquiry to General Emmons 
asking his views on the subject of evacuating the island of Oahu. He responded that such 
a move would be highly dangerous and impracticable; large quantities of expensive and 
unavailable building materials would be needed for construction of the camps and many 
additional troops (who were already scarce in numbers) would be required to guard the 
islands. Moreover, Emmons argued that a mass evacuation of the ethnic Japanese, who 
provided most of the island’s skilled labor, including a great many Army employees, 
would severely disrupt Oahu. Over 90 percent of carpenters, nearly all transportation 
workers and a high percentage of agricultural workers were of Japanese ancestry, and 
were absolutely essential to rebuild the defenses destroyed by the December 7th attack, 
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unless replaced by an equivalent labor force from the mainland.150 Business leaders in 
Hawaii were also unwilling to permit the mass uprooting of the Japanese because they 
knew that the evacuation of over one-third of Hawaii’s population would decimate their 
labor force and destroy the economy of the islands.151  
Following an on-the-spot assessment, even [Assistant] Secretary [of War] 
McCloy joined local authorities in discouraging the called-for transplantation 
which could topple the island economy if undertaken without sending in an 
equivalent labor force of comparable skill and experience.152  
 
Additionally, there were not enough ships available to transport Hawaii’s entire Japanese 
population over to the mainland, nor were there even enough soldiers to guard them.153  
 While stressing the military and logistical difficulties of carrying out an entire 
mass evacuation, Emmons did agree to a selective evacuation, which would remove those 
who were considered potentially dangerous in the event of a crisis and “a few hundred 
who were considered to be contributing nothing to the war effort, including families of 
some who had been interned.”154 In compliance with this compromise on evacuation, on 
Emmons sent the first group to the mainland on 12 January 1942. However, once they 
arrived on the West Coast, the Justice Department refused to accept them because their 
arrests had been conducted under martial law. Consequently, they were returned to 
Hawaii. Yet on 18 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an order to General Emmons 
that “Japanese residents (either U.S. citizens or nationals) as are considered… to 
constitute a source of danger be transported to the U.S. mainland and placed under guard 
in concentration camps.”155 Accordingly, the War Department then ordered a selective 
removal of up to 15,000 Japanese “resettlement” areas on the mainland. As many as 
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1,217 Japanese Hawaiians soon were sent to the mainland and were placed in the WRA 
relocation camps, producing a total of 2,092 Hawaiians removed. Additionally, there 
were about 300 Japanese evacuees who remained in Hawaii and were interned at the 
Army’s own Honouliuli Gulch internment camp on Oahu after the Sand Island detention 
center was closed. The total number of all Japanese Americans from Hawaii who were 
detained came to be about 2,392 – less than one percent of the entire ethnic Japanese 
population in Hawaii, and quite miniscule in comparison to those subjected to mass 
evacuation on the mainland.156 
 In comparison with the racially-fueled situation on the mainland during World 
War II, the Territory of Hawaii was in a much more advantageous and exceptional 
position from that of the mainland. Although the lives of all individuals living in Hawaii 
were subjugated to the corrupt and Draconian martial law, the majority of Japanese in 
Hawaii were not subjected to the discriminatory racial treatment of their counterparts on 
the mainland. They avoided both the camps and the atrocious anti-Asian wrath 
demonstrated by public opinion on the West Coast because, in a particularly rare 
occurrence, the ethnic Japanese in Hawaii were too large a population for the government 
to force a mass evacuation program. For once, the ethnic minority had triumphed over the 
haole majority. 
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Simultaneously Fighting Prejudice And Nazis: The Legacy of The 
100th/442nd Regimental Combat Team 
 
“These haole soldiers from the Mainland looked at us 
and couldn’t tell the difference. They were probably 
thinking, ‘How come these POWs are wearing American 
uniforms?’” – Edward Tarutani, 1399th Engineer 
Construction Battalion 
 
 
 On 28 August 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a bill mobilizing the 
National Guard of the United States and other reserve components for a period of one 
year. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department thus officially received 
word that the Hawaii National Guard units of the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments 
would be called to active duty on 15 October 1940. These regiments were comprised of 
110 officers and 1,741 enlisted men; a large number of these men were Americans of 
Japanese descent. The majority of the 298th were recruits from Oahu, while the 299th was 
comprised of residents from the other Islands of Hawaii.157 
 After the December 7th attack on Pearl Harbor, members of the Hawaii National 
Guard were called on to guard against possible enemy invasion during the chaotic hours 
after the attack. As fears of a Japanese attack increased in the early months of 1942, 
Hawaii Military Governor Delos Emmons decided to form the Nisei members of the 
Hawaii National Guard into a battalion to be sent to the mainland. The Hawaii 
Provisional Infantry Battalion was formed in near secrecy and on 5 June 1942, as the 
Battle of Midway raged, 1,432 men shipped out for San Francisco. After landing on the 
mainland, they traveled by train to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where they would train for 
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the next six months. These men became the original members of the 100th Infantry 
Battalion and established their unit’s motto as “Remember Pearl Harbor.”158 
 Under typical pre-war Army procedures, battalions were called first, second and 
third, and were a part of a regiment. But the 100th Battalion was a separate unit, with no 
sheltering regiment. With the outbreak of the war, the Army began to implement a 
recently formulated plan for the modern organization of Combat Arms. Under this new 
system of organization, the Infantry Regiments were reorganized as a headquarters 
without any organic battalions, but with three Separate Battalions attached. HQ was 
organized into three Combat Commands that could be dispatched on separate combat 
actions that they were attached to. One Infantry Battalion would be assigned to a Combat 
Command, with attachments from the higher HQ reserve. Thus, the 100th as a Separate 
Infantry Battalion was not attached to any other military organizations and became its 
own fighting unit.159 
 The 100th was the first US military unit made up entirely of Japanese Americans, 
although its officers were predominantly Caucasian. It was also an overstrength battalion; 
instead of four companies, it had six, and instead of the usual eight hundred or so 
soldiers, it had more than fourteen hundred. Its designation by a unique number, which 
was usually reserved for regiments and higher units, and as “separate,” indicated its 
special status in the Army’s tables of organization.160 The men of the 100th soon had a 
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nickname of their own for the outfit. They called it “One-Puka-Puka,” with the word 
“puka” being a Hawaiian word that was a double entendre for both “zero” and “hole.”161 
 The 100th would only be assigned to the European Theater. Although several 
army generals declined to have the 100th attached to their command, it was happily 
accepted by General Mark Clark. Under General Clark’s Fifth Army, the 100th joined the 
133rd Regiment, and became a part of the 34th Division, commanded by Major General 
Charles W. Ryder. Once Ryder received news of the new battalion’s arrival, he promised 
to stand by the 100th under all circumstances, giving it exactly what he gave all his other 
men. Before the 100th Battalion arrived, General Ryder dispatched a self-authored 
memorandum to his troops with the firm message that the new men were not to be called 
or referred to as “Japs,” as it was the one name they would not tolerate. Colonel Ray C. 
Fountain, the Commanding Officer of the 133rd, shared the same thoughts as Ryder on 
the need for equal non-discriminatory treatment of the Hawaiians, as with all the other 
men of the command. In the same style as General Ryder, Colonel Fountain informed his 
officers and men of the respectful behavior he expected of them on their introduction to 
the new battalion: 
“They are not Japanese,” he said, “but Americans born in Hawaii. They don’t ask 
any special consideration and we won’t give them anything that isn’t given to all 
other units. The battalion will be fighting with the rest of us taking its regular 
turns.”162 
 
By late September 1943, the 100th had landed on the beaches of Salerno, Italy and 
continued to push the enemy north in the following months. When the Allied armies’ 
drive up the Italian peninsula was stalled by the German line, the unit was ordered to join 
the assault on the heavily defended German position of Monte Cassino, which boasted an 
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elaborate series of minefields and fortified bunkers. There, the 100th and other Allied 
units suffered horrible casualties. In the case of the 100th, 1,300 men had been in the unit 
when it entered Italy; after Cassino, there were just under 600 men capable of combat, 
which earned the battalion the nickname the “Purple Heart Battalion.” From January 
1944 to June 1944, the 100th fought ferociously at Monte Cassino, and eventually 
succeeded in clearing the Allied pathway to Rome.  
 
The Purple Heart medal.163 
Monte Cassino was the last campaign that the original 100th Infantry Battalion 
completed. From that point on, replacements from the new volunteer 442nd Regimental 
Combat Team began filling its ranks.164 Upon hearing of the 100th’s outstanding military 
performance, George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff offered to send the battalion to shape 
up other American units. He later wrote: 
So we sent messages to [American] commanders in Europe and, as I recall… 
Eisenhower’s staff people declined them. Then I offered them to General Clark 
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and his reply was, “We will take anybody that will fight.” So I sent this battalion 
over to him.…I will say [this] about the Japanese fighting in these units… they 
were superb!... They took terrific casualties. They showed rare courage and 
tremendous fighting spirit….We used them quite dramatically in the great 
advance in Italy.…165 
 
 While in the previous year the Nisei who were active in the service before Pearl 
Harbor had found themselves suddenly released from duty, and all Nisei eligible to serve 
in the military had been classified as “4-C” enemy aliens, now, with the need for more 
troops as the war continued, the War Department became open to the idea of creating a 
Nisei unit, although it believed it should be a segregated unit. Strong lobbying in the US 
for the creation of Nisei units, as well as the outstanding performance of the 100th, helped 
lead the War Department to consider creating other Japanese American military units, 
mainly for use in the European Theater. On 1 February 1943, President Roosevelt 
approved the proposal of the War Department to “organize a team consisting of loyal 
American citizens of Japanese descent.”166 FDR finally admitted: 
No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to 
exercise the responsibilities of citizenship, regardless of his ancestry. The 
principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been 
governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is 
not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. A good American is one who is 
loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy. Every loyal 
American citizen should be given the opportunity to serve this country wherever 
his skills will make the greatest contribution – whether it be in the ranks of the 
armed forces, war production, agriculture, government service, or other work 
essential to the war effort.167 
 
And so, the excellent training record of the 100th Battalion and the steady stream of 
petitions and lobbying by prominent civilian and military personnel helped convince 
President Roosevelt and the War Department to re-open military service to Nisei 
                                                
165 “100th,” Go For Broke. 
166 Vincent Tajiri, ed., Through Innocent Eyes: Writings and Art from the Japanese American Internment by 
Poston I Schoolchildren (Los Angeles: Keiro Services Press, 1990), 105. 
167 Tajiri, Through Innocent Eyes, 105. 
 88 
volunteers. The first Nisei unit to be created was the 442nd Regimental Combat Team 
(RCT). 
 Furthermore, the Office of War Information, President Roosevelt, and the War 
Department made the decision to call for a Nisei fighting unit in order to use it as a 
propaganda weapon to counter Japanese and other Axis claims of American racism 
towards the incarcerated Japanese Americans.168 An official booklet published by the 
War Relocation Authority entitled “Nisei in Uniform,” presented the notion of Nisei 
fighting in the war from the most extreme Americanized view possible, and used the new 
unit was to be the 442nd Regimental Combat Team as its focus. From the first page of its 
booklet, the WRA explicitly made an effort to address and disavow any Axis claims of 
American racism. The preliminary page was emblazoned with the headline, 
“AMERICANS, ALL!” and underneath there was a short but powerful introductory 
paragraph that proclaimed, “every race and nation from which our population has been 
drawn is represented among the young Americans who are fighting side by side to 
overthrow the Axis powers.”169 It continued on to describe German Americans to 
smashing the German Nazis and Italian Americans driving the Axis forces from Italy, 
concluding with the statement that, “men whose parents came from Japan are showing 
that devotion to America and gallantry in action are not determined by the slant of the 
eyes or the color of the skin.”170  
 Representatives of the War Department who were assigned to the relocation 
centers to raise recruits for the 442nd explained the reasons for the formation of a 
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segregated Japanese unit that the WRA delicately referred to as “a distinctively Japanese 
American unit in the Army”171: 
If your strength were diffused through the Army of the United States – as has 
already been done with many other Americans of your blood, relatively little 
account would be taken of your action. You would be important only as 
manpower – nothing more. But united, and working together, you would become 
a symbol of something greater than your individual selves, and the effect would 
be felt both in the United States and abroad. All other Americans would long 
remember what you had done for the country, and you would be a living reproach 
to those who have been prejudiced against you because of your Japanese blood.172 
 
When the call went out for volunteers for the 442nd, the initial goal was for 3,000 
volunteers from the mainland and 1,500 from Hawaii. However, it soon became apparent 
that those quotas were reversed: embittered by their confinement, barely 1,000 Nisei 
volunteered from behind barbed wire. But in Hawaii, where there had been no mass 
evacuation, more than 10,000 Nisei stepped forward. The new recruits were sent to Camp 
Shelby in Mississippi for basic training.173 
 The 442nd Regimental Combat Team included the 522nd Field Artillery Battalion, 
232nd Combat Engineer Company, 206th Army Ground Force Band, as well as an 
Antitank Company, Cannon Company, Service Company, medical detachment, 
headquarters companies, and three infantry battalions. The 1st Infantry Battalion remained 
in the States to train new recruits, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions joined the 100th 
Battalion, which was already fighting in Italy. When the much-decorated 100th Battalion 
was incorporated into the 442nd in June 1944, it was allowed to keep its original 
designation because of its outstanding combat record. Thus, the infantry units of the 
422nd RCT were the 100th, 2nd and 3rd Battalions.174 
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 The motto of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team was “Go for Broke.” As a 
gambling term that meant risking everything on one great effort to win big, it was perfect 
for the Nisei of the 442nd – they were fighting two wars: one against the Axis powers 
abroad and one against the prejudice of their home turf in America. 
 The Hawaii-born Nisei, also known as “Buddaheads,” made up about two-thirds 
of the regiment, while the remaining third were Nisei from the mainland, also known as 
“Kotonks.” The term “Buddahead” originated as a general term for a person of Japanese 
descent, but soon came to be associated with Japanese Americans from Hawaii during 
World War II.175 Meanwhile, the Hawaiians derided the mainlanders by referring to them 
as “Kotonks,” meaning that they were empty-headed. “Kotonk” was said to be the sound 
that an empty coconut makes hitting the ground, and is still used occasionally in Hawaii 
today.176  
In April 1943, when the islanders and mainlanders arrived for training at Camp 
Shelby, they immediately began to fight with each other because of their different 
perspectives based on where they grew up. The Buddhaheads represented the largest 
ethnic group in a small island community, which was much different from the situation 
on the mainland. When Pearl Harbor was attacked, the Buddaheads, like everyone else on 
the island, responded to the emergency; no one rejected them as they pitched in to aid the 
wounded, give blood and bury the dead. But in Mississippi they met racial 
discrimination; when the Hawaii boys used to go out around Camp Shelby to the nearby 
Southern cities, they would come back and complain, “You know, the American people, 
they’re very cold. We go to USO, and the girls don’t treat us, say we’re different. We 
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look different. We’re just not accepted. They think we’re Japanese, not Americans.”177 
They were not accustomed to the prejudice and discrimination typical of the mainland. 
But the Kotonks were, as they were members of a small minority group who had already 
experienced severe discrimination on the mainland, especially when their families were 
locked up in incarceration camps. In fact, most of the mainlander soldiers had been in the 
camps themselves. “The army thought yeah, they’re all Japanese Americans, throw them 
all in together, but they didn’t realize there are differences.”178 Most of the conflicts 
between the Hawaiians and the mainlanders were a result of miscommunication, 
stereotyping, and differences in culture: 
The California boys came in with their “pachuko” haircuts (slicked back ducktail 
haircuts), those zoot suits, those great big hats and the pants that came down tight 
around the ankles…. They were fancy, way out dressed and the Hawaii boys 
came with their bare feet, T-shirts and pidgin English. It was like throwing two 
roosters in a pen together.179 
 
 As this quote suggests, language acted in a divisive way between the Hawaiians 
and the mainlanders. Japanese Americans from Hawaii were raised in the multicultural 
stew of the plantation economy that led them to speak a variation of the Hawaiian Creole 
Language, most commonly known as Pidgin English, or just plain Pidgin. According to 
the Hawaii native Senator Daniel Inouye, Pidgin was “absolutely foreign to the 
mainlanders because our pidgin was very unique and exclusive for Hawaii.”180 It was a 
combination of strange grammatical construction and a mixture of Hawaiian, Japanese, 
Portuguese, Chinese, and broken English that originated as the only means of 
communication between the different ethnic plantation workers. In Hawaii, those who 
spoke standard English were viewed as “arrogant race traitors who thought they were too 
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good to speak like everyone else.”181 But for the mainlanders who all spoke regular 
English, half of the time none of them could recognize what the Hawaiians were saying 
and the two groups had a difficult time understanding each other at the beginning. 
 The Hawaiians thought the mainlanders were sullen and snobby, and not 
confident and friendly. They regarded the mainland group as being only out for 
themselves and of being overly concerned with what other people thought. One Hawaiian 
Nisei veteran of the 442nd recalled probing the mainlanders with questions like, “Hey, 
you mainland guys, something wrong your pupuli [crazy] heads?” and the mainlanders 
would not understand and ask “what’s wrong with it?” “Aw, you buggas, you sit quiet, 
never do anything wrong. Don’t go out and get polluted and stuff like that.”182 
Meanwhile, the mainlanders saw the Hawaiians as loud, uncouth and bullying men, who 
engaged in frequent brawls. 
 The Hawaiians were also quite prone to jump into fights. Many 
misunderstandings, especially when fueled by alcohol, turned into fistfights. In fact, that 
was one of the factors that led up to the mainlanders receiving the name “Kotonk,” 
because it was the sound their heads made when they hit the floor.183 Tosh Yasutake, a 
“Kotonk” veteran of the 442nd, recalled in a 2002 interview how the “Hawaiian fellows” 
did not take to “being bossed around too much I guess, being told what to do and… any 
authoritarian type of thing, they really fought it pretty hard and they’re a lot more, they 
want[ed] to be more independent.”184 Another distinction between the Hawaiians and 
mainlanders was how the Hawaiian Nisei tended to stick together in groups: 
The local guys are group-oriented whereas on the mainland it seemed like they 
brought up, you know, each had to fend for themselves type of thing. And if some 
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Hawaiian got in trouble, especially with some haole [white/Caucasian] soldier 
from the Texas division that wanted to hassle, all the Hawaii guys would jump in, 
you know. They wouldn’t let the one guy go and fight his own battle; they all 
jumped in and helped him. Well, eventually, I think the mainland guys got to 
appreciate that, that if any outsider insulted them or called them “Japs” or 
anything like that, the Nisei in the 442, as a group, would react and wouldn’t take 
that kind of crap.185 
 
 Because the friction between the two groups was so bad, the military high 
command considered disbanding the 442nd because they thought they could never get the 
men to fight together overseas as a unit. Therefore, the Army decided to send some of the 
Hawaii recruits to visit the internment camps in Arkansas. The Hawaiian men previously 
thought that the Jerome and Rohwer Relocation Centers were little towns with Japanese 
families, but once their trucks rolled past the barbed wire fence, past the guard towers 
armed with machine guns pointed at the unarmed internees, past the rough and uniform 
barracks where whole families were crowded in small compartments and forced to live 
without any privacy – suddenly the Buddaheads understood. Soon after, word of the 
camps swiftly spread, and the Buddaheads gained a whole new kind of respect for the 
Kotonks. Immediately, the men in the 442nd became united as one. According to the ex-
Buddahead and highly esteemed Senator Daniel K. Inouye, 
Overnight the situation in Camp Shelby changed because the word went out like 
wildfire. The experiment worked. I went back and said, “I got to tell you guys 
about these Mainlanders. You won’t believe what I’m going to tell you.” And this 
must have gone on in every hut throughout camp. The next day, you thought you 
were visiting a new regiment. We were blood brothers. The regiment was not 
formed when we volunteered, nor when we arrived in Camp Shelby – it was 
formed after this visit.186 
 
 From May 1943 through February 1944, the men trained together for combat. 
They excelled at maneuvers and learned to operate as a fully functional team. In March, 
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General George Marshall inspected the regiment, and in April the regiment packed up. 
On 1 May 1944, the men finally boarded ships destined for Europe.187 
 Perhaps the most legendary episode in the history of the 100th Infantry/442nd 
Regimental Combat Team was its rescue of “the Lost Battalion” in the Vosges Mountains 
of France at the end of October 1944. As the 36th Infantry Division, which included both 
the Nisei 100th/442nd RCT and the 1st Battalion of the 141st Texas Regiment (the soon-to-
be “Lost Battalion”), pushed toward Germany in late 1944, they faced some of their 
heaviest German resistance, as well as the harsh terrain of in the Vosges Mountains of 
eastern France. On the front lines of the Allied assault, Major General John E. Dahlquist, 
commander of the 36th Division, pushed the 141st Regiment forward to liberate more 
French territory. The Texans moved quickly through the trees and, in their haste to 
recapture more territory, unknowingly separated themselves from their fellow soldiers 
and found themselves surrounded by German units. The 1st Battalion lost contact with 
headquarters and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions made little headway in their failed attempts to 
reach their comrades.188 By October, 275 Texans, members of the 1st Battalion, 141st 
Regiment, 36th Infantry Division, were trapped on a steep ridge in the forest east of 
Biffontaine, cut off from the rest of their regiment and surrounded by Germans.189 The 
Allies attempted to drop food and supplies to the men, but as temperatures fell, rations 
began to run out and the conditions of the wounded deteriorated. The situation was 
desperate for the men of the 1st Battalion. 
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The Rescue of the Lost Battalion190 
 
 After two previous attempts to rescue the 1st Battalion failed, Dahlquist turned to 
the 442nd. The fighting was difficult and the Nisei had to struggle tenaciously for every 
yard of ground.  
[The Germans] were so well entrenched, we had a hell of a time getting through. 
A lotta’ there we’d have to just crawl, crawl from position to position, stick your 
head out just a little bit and fire, and keep moving up slowly at a time, yeah. That 
was really rough fighting.191 
 
By 29 October, they had fought for five long days, but had not made much progress 
against the heavily entrenched Germans. At some points during the battle the Nisei had 
found themselves outnumbered by as many as four to one and, due to their high casualty 
rate, resorted to final attacks of desperation. “We yelled our heads off and charged and 
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shot the head off everything that moved… we didn’t care anymore… we acted like a 
bunch of savages.”192 
Finally, on 30 October, after six days of violent and frenzied combat, the 442nd 
broke through to the Lost Battalion. The Nisei rescued the 211 men who remained of the 
initial group of 275 Texans who had been surrounded. Many from both units were 
wounded or killed by mines, sniper fire, heavy artillery and spraying shrapnel. One 
survivor recalled, “In that battle, just about everybody was injured or killed…. But 
everybody got injured.”193 “Our guys were shot up and we could hear them in the forest, 
crying out for their mothers. Even the Germans… I could hear them crying in the 
darkness.”194 The 36th Infantry Division suffered staggering casualty rates in the process 
and those companies that participated in the final push to reach the 141st were reduced on 
average to less than half their normal full strength after the battle. During the six days the 
442nd fought to rescue the Lost Battalion, 54 men were killed and many, many more were 
wounded and sent to hospitals. At the time the US Army listed the rescue of the Lost 
Battalion as one of the top ten battles in its history.195 
 One of the best military units within the 442nd Regimental Combat Team was the 
522nd Field Artillery Battalion. As one of the fastest, most efficient artillery units in the 
European Theater, the 522nd supported the infantry by shooting heavy artillery fire from 
105mm Howitzers. (A Howitzer was a type of long-range cannon with a barrel that was 
about 4.1 inches wide.) Yet, the 522nd was not best known for its acclaimed rapid 
firepower, rather, it was best known for the role it played in the liberation of Jewish 
                                                
192 Grubb, “Rescue.” 
193 Fred Matsumura Interview.  
194 Chang, “I Can Never,” 38. 
195 “Rescue of The Lost Battalion,” Go For Broke, last modified 2006, 
http://goforbroke.org/history/history_historical_campaigns_rescue.asp. 
 97 
survivors of the Landsberg-Kaufering Dachau Death March and Dachau sub-camps in the 
last months of the war in Europe.196 
 In March 1945, the 522nd Field Artillery Battalion left the 442nd RCT at the 
Maritime Alps. It became a roving battalion, shifting to whatever command most needed 
the unit, which was how it came to find itself at one of the slave labor sub-camps of 
Dachau on 29 April 1945. In a small Bavarian town east of Munich, the Nisei of the 
522nd stumbled upon what appeared to be some barracks encircled by barbed wire. 
Technician Fourth Grade Ichiro Imamura described it in his diary: 
I watched as one of the scouts used his carbine to shoot off the chain that held the 
prison gates shut…. [They saw bodies inside.] They weren’t dead, as he had first 
thought. When the gates swung open, we got our first good look at the prisoners. 
Many of them were Jews. They were wearing striped prison suits and round caps. 
It was cold and the snow was two feet deep in some places. There were no 
German guards. The prisoners struggled to their feet… They shuffled weakly out 
of the compound. They were like skeletons – all skin and bones.…197 
 
The Nisei found this camp mostly deserted because Hitler and Himmler had 
already ordered the camp commanders to march the prisoners south to the Austrian 
border, away from the advancing Allied armies. The brutal death marches began on 24 
April. By 2 May, the death march had reached the outskirts of Waakirchen, near the 
Austrian border. On that day, soldiers from the 522nd were patrolling near Waakirchen 
and came across an open field with several hundred “lumps in the snow.” But when the 
soldiers inspected them more closely, they realized that the “lumps” were people: some 
had been shot, some were dead from exposure, but hundreds were actually alive – yet 
only barely.  
But it was really sad. They were just so hungry. They were sick then and lot of 
‘em without teeth. They were half dead, actually. And they, but they came out of 
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camp. And we were told not to feed ‘em because they hadn’t eaten for so long 
that if we fed ‘em anything that they would have died there anyway.198 
 
For the next three days, the Nisei soldiers carried the survivors, clad in black and white 
prison garb, with shaven heads, sunken eyes and hollowed cheeks, into warm houses and 
barns. The soldiers gave them blankets, water and only tiny bits of food because of their 
severe malnourishment.199 
 Josef Erbs, a survivor of Dachau, never learned the name of his rescuer but 
remembered his unusual appearance:  
On April 29, a big Oriental man saved my life. I was 18 years old, 76 pounds at 
the time, barely alive. He picked me up from the ground, inside the camp. His 
uniform had an emblem – blue, with a white hand and white torch. He was a 
young Asian man with the American Army. Never before had I seen an Asian 
man or a black man.…200 
 
That man was saved by a Japanese American, as were many others. After the war, one of 
the men of the 522nd, Rudy Tokiwa, was fortunate enough to meet and form a warm 
friendship with a Dachau survivor. Although they had not met at Dachau, Tokiwa’s 
Jewish friend made a point to thank him, “If it wasn’t for you guys, I wouldn’t be here. 
Not that, not that you were the one that picked me up or anything. But because of your 
group of people and what they were fighting for. Because of that, I’m here today. I 
respect you people and I bow my head to you.”201 
 Some have claimed that the men of the 522nd had participated in one of the 
“greatest ironies of World War II,” because, as members of a persecuted minority, the 
Japanese Americans saved members of another persecuted minority, the European Jews. 
Yes, both minority groups were victims of a blatant disregard for civil liberties and 
human rights by their governments, but how can anyone even possibly conceive the idea 
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that it is acceptable to compare the two? In absolutely no way could the deadly, 
unimaginable, gruesome and horrifying evils of the Holocaust even compare to the 
United States government’s treatment of the incarceration of Japanese Americans. The 
interned Nikkei were never subjected to the cruel treatment that the Jews were, and their 
incarceration never spawned any of the same damaging and condemning effects of 
Hitler’s camps that transformed humanity into beaten, destroyed and helpless beings. 
What I saw… was too horrible for words to describe. It was pitiful. How could 
anyone be that cruel to human beings? We didn’t know how important what we 
were doing was in liberating the death march of Dachau.202 
 
 The 442nd Regimental Combat Team is considered to be the most decorated 
infantry regiment in the history of the US Army for the length of its active service. The 
442nd was awarded eight Presidential Unit Citations, originally known as the 
Distinguished Unit Citation, which is awarded to units of the Armed Forces for 
extraordinary heroism in action. There were also 21 members of the 442nd who were 
awarded the Medal of Honor, the United States of America’s highest military honor, 
awarded for personal acts of valor above and beyond the call of duty. 
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Atonement by Apology And Monetary Restitution 
“To undo a mistake is always harder than not to create 
one originally but we seldom have the foresight. 
Therefore we have no choice but to try to correct our 
past mistakes.” – Eleanor Roosevelt 
 
 
 On 17 December 1944, the War Department announced the lifting of the West 
Coast exclusion orders, and the War Relocation Authority simultaneously announced that 
the relocation centers would be closed within one year. The initial reactions of the 
evacuees varied because some immediately returned to the West Coast, while some 
others vowed to never leave the centers. Alas, some of the first to return to the West 
Coast encountered violence and hostility and had an immensely difficult time finding 
housing and jobs. Others had more success across the country, since many feared 
returning to the hostile West Coast and found refuge in cities like Denver, Salt Lake City 
and Chicago.  
 When the closing of the camps was first announced, many were frightened and 
unsure of how to live their lives outside of the barbed fence wire communities they had 
come to identify as home for the past three years. They were frightened of how the 
outside world would treat them since public opinion was one of the leading causes for 
their mass incarceration. Many were terrified of being thrown together with whites after 
the segregated life of the camps, while there were even those who felt shame when they 
were let out of camp. When Jeanne Wakatsuki, the author and leading character in her 
autobiographical memoir, Farewell To Manzanar, learned of her own release, she was 
forced to face her future and feared the uncertainty it would bring. She believed that the 
only thing waiting for her outside the gates of Manzanar was a world filled with hate. 
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Through her active imagination, Jeanne soon found herself haunted by a nightmarish 
version of the outside world filled with a hatred that made her sick: 
It was the humiliation. That continuous, unnamed ache I had been living with was 
precise and definable now. Call it the foretaste of being hated. I knew ahead of 
time that if someone looked at me with hate, I would have to allow it, to swallow 
it, because something in me, something about me deserved it. At ten I saw that 
coming, like a judge’s sentence, and I would have stayed inside the camp forever 
rather than step outside and face such a moment.203 
 
Others were reluctant to leave the relocation centers, not because of their fear of the 
outside world, but because of their age. There were thousands of the elderly who knew 
readjustment to outside conditions would be very difficult for them because they now 
lacked the energy or capital to make a fresh start in a new location of the nation. 
 Evacuees had to relocate on their own. The WRA provided only the minimum 
assistance of $25 per person, train fare and meals on route for those with less than $500 
in cash. Very few could come back to their prewar holdings, for instance, only about 25 
percent of the prewar farm operators still retained their property.204 As might be 
expected, many of the internees left when ordered, and by September over 15,000 
evacuees a month were leaving the various centers. Yet many had no place to go since 
they had lost their homes and businesses in the relocation. In the end, the WRA had to 
resort to forced evictions of those reluctant to leave the camps by giving the remaining 
evacuees train fare to the point of their evacuation in order to make them leave. All the 
relocation centers were finally closed by the end of 1945 and were left abandoned. On 15 
May 1946, the last WRA field office was closed and on 30 June 1946, the WRA was 
officially disbanded.205  
 Over 40 years later, in the year 1988, Congress finally apologized for the mass 
wartime relocation of Japanese Americans by stating that relocation was “motivated 
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largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership.”206 
Remedial action was recommended and Congress acted to give redress, setting aside 
$500 million. On 10 August 1988, President Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act into 
law and a “Civil Liberties Act of 1988: Questions and Answers” information packet was 
mailed to all those interned by the US Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s 
Office of Redress Administration. My grandmother, Setsuko Kawashiri Speck, received 
the mailing, which said: 
The purposes of the Act are to acknowledge and apologize for the fundamental 
injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and internment, to make restitution, and to 
fund a public education program to prevent the recurrence of any similar event in 
the future.207 
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Under the Act, the responsibility for making restitution was given to the Attorney 
General, who in turn established the Office of Redress Administration (ORA). The ORA 
was charged with identifying, locating, and making payment in the amount of $20,000 to 
each eligible individual. There were an estimated 65,000 eligible recipients, with 
payments to be made to the oldest first. Among those eligible was my grandmother, who 
received a flyer with the headline, “ATTENTION! IMPORTANT NOTICE” as a note 
of reassurance that she had been verified and was eligible to receive redress under the 
Act. Starting in October 1990, the ORA was authorized to make up to 25,000 redress 
payments each fiscal year, in order of birth. 208 Due to her date of birth, Setsuko was not 
eligible to receive her redress payment until the fiscal year of 1993, and once she 
received it she allocated it to paying off her family’s mortgage. 
 
Notice of eligibility for receiving redress, The Office of Redress Administration, 1990. 
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 Setsuko was also among those who received checks and letters from the 
President. Setsuko’s letter came from President George Bush in October 1990. Bush’s 
letter contained an apology acknowledging that money and words alone could not 
“restore lost years or erase painful memories; neither can they fully convey our Nation’s 
resolve to rectify injustice and to uphold the rights of individuals.”209 Although one could 
never fully right the wrongs of the past, Bush declared that they could take a stand for 
justice and recognize the serious injustices done to the Japanese Americans during the 
war. He concluded the short letter with the apology: 
In enacting a law calling for restitution and offering a sincere apology, your 
fellow Americans have, in a very real sense, renewed their traditional 
commitment to the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice. You and your family 
have our best wishes for the future.210 
 
 
Letter of apology from the White House for the treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II, President 
George Bush, October 1990. 
                                                
209 George H.W. Bush, Letter of apology for internment, October 1990, Private family collection. 
210 Bush, Letter of apology. 
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Although the war ended over seventy years ago many members of the present 
Japanese American community seek to preserve their heritage and the dark wartime 
legacy of internment, and to educate both Japanese Americans and the public at large 
about that experience. The majority of present-day Japanese American organizations and 
associations are centered around the preservation and education of the legacy left behind 
by the camps. For instance, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), as the oldest 
and largest Asian Pacific American civil rights organization, still strives today to promote 
a world that honors diversity through the respect of values such as equality and social 
justice – values that were denied to the Japanese Americans when they were forced into a 
life of incarceration behind barbed wire.  
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Conclusion 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” 
 
 
  The Japanese American experience during World War II was filled with 
complexities that I would have never discovered without studying the three different 
aspects of Japanese wartime experience. These various experiences led to varied results. 
Therefore, in accord with the three main focuses of my thesis, I have drawn three 
separate conclusions from my research as well. 
One of the most prominent results of the wartime experience was the 
Americanization of the Japanese inhabiting the United States. The WRA specifically 
pursued an Americanization policy within the Nisei generation of American-born citizens 
as its main target. But the Japanese themselves, even in the camps, wanted to be 
Americans – the children played baseball and American games and practice the oath of 
allegiance. The result was a new kind of cultural amalgamation, combining both Japanese 
and American identities. Ironically, even after the prejudiced wartime treatment the 
Japanese Americans had been subjected to, both the Issei and Nisei emerged from the 
war with an adopted American culture. The entire structure, programs, and community 
lifestyle of the relocation camps were organized in complete American fashion, and 
helped conditioned the Japanese internees into embracing the American lifestyle. After 
the end of the war and the closing of the camps, the Japanese dispersed throughout the 
country and had to integrate themselves into American society. The Japanese Americans 
no longer clung to the need to live in segregated Japanese communities as they were 
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accustomed to do before the war; instead, their wartime experience had prepared them for 
a more American lifestyle and led them down the path to living a much more culturally 
American life.  
 Studying the dual cultural identities of the Nisei generation and the people of 
Hawaii’s general acceptance of the many cultures that constituted their uniquely 
interethnic Hawaiian society has led me to see the importance of diversity. As a range of 
different races and cultures continue to mix with one another and are introduced into our 
country, it is crucial for us all to maintain an open-mind and consent to embrace such 
ethnic diversity. Through the successful cultural co-habitation, cultural amalgamation, 
and the equally successful interracial interactions that dominated the Hawaiian Islands 
throughout the past three centuries, a more tolerant, progressive, and socially aware 
environment has been produced. The proof lies in the Hawaiian Nisei soldiers of the 100th 
and 442nd Regimental Combat Team, who had rarely been targeted with the same cruel 
and vicious acts of racism that their mainland counterparts had been subjected to and 
came to accept as a way of life. This report contains countless examples of the terrible 
actions and detrimental effects that prejudice, ignorance, and discrimination have been 
produced throughout the world; such was the basis for the Japanese American internment 
and the Holocaust. In order to form a more educated, peaceful, and morally sound world, 
society must wholly embrace diversity and adopt an accepting and tolerant worldview. 
 As demonstrated during World War II, “military necessity” can easily lead to a 
corruption of our nation’s values. Even a democratic nation that promises “liberty and 
justice for all” can be seduced by the great powers that could be seized during wartime by 
the leaders of the nation. The United States of America was a nation whose government 
abused its powers by justifying its actions as a wartime necessity. The mass relocation 
and incarceration of over 110,000 innocent Japanese lives was one major violation of 
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civil liberties that the government pursued, validating it as a “military necessity.” Another 
was the harsh rule that came to grip the Territory of Hawaii while under martial law. The 
writ of habeas corpus was suspended, strict laws were heavily enforced, well past what 
was required, and all civilians were haunted by the very real possibility that they could be 
dragged into the relentlessly unfair and chaotic provost courts and declared guilty of a 
crime they had not committed. During times of war, widespread fear and hysteria can 
lead to a nation ruled by irrationality and corruption. 
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Appendix: Family Genealogy From The Perspective Of Malia Ogawa 
 
KAWASHIRI FAMILY 
Issei Generation 
 Great-Grandfather Yasukichi Kawashiri (b. 1899) 
 Great-Grandmother Toshiko Sumi Kawashiri (b. 1905) 
Nisei Generation 
Great-Aunt Hideko Kawashiri (b. 1927) 
 Grandmother Setsuko Kawashiri (b. 1929) 
Great-Uncle Takashi Kawashiri (b. 1931) 
Great-Uncle Kiyoshi Kawashiri (b. 1933) 
Great-Aunt Yuriko Kawashiri (b. 1936) 
Great-Uncle Shigeru Kawashiri (b. 1938) 
Great-Aunt Chiyo Kawashiri (b. 1940) 
 
In the summer of 1942, the Kawashiri family was relocated to the Poston camp in 
Arizona. They were assigned to block 226, 11A and 11B – two rooms for a family with 
seven children, plus their grandfather and Uncle Yoshito. During the next three years, the 
Kawashiris tried to live their lives as normal as possible. They walked everywhere they 
went; sometimes Setsuko would walk six or seven miles with her Grandfather to go visit 
her aunt. The Kawashiri children always tried to turn the camp into games by sneaking 
around in the bushes and shrubs behind their block. Sets was even recruited to take over 
one of the two 4th grade classes every half-day of school. As time went on, people, 
especially the young adults, began to relocate to the outside. Uncle Yoshi and a group of 
his friends first went to Utah, where they worked in the sugarbeet fields, and then went 
on to Chicago. Shortly thereafter, he was inducted into the Army and served most of his 
time in Belgium.  
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Setsuko posing with the leaves of a tree during her incarceration at Poston, Private family collection, date 
unknown. 
 
The Kawashiri children and a group of their friends in Poston, Private family collection, date unknown. 
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The Kawashiris were interned for three years; upon entering incarceration, Setsuko was 
12, and upon their release in 1945, she was 15. Instead of returning to California, her 
family moved to New Jersey and lived there for seven years. But in 1950, everyone in the 
family returned to California, except for Setsuko. At 22 years old, she headed to 
Washington D.C. to look for a job in the public health service.  
 
 
Setsuko as a young and ambitious woman in her 20’s, Private family collection, date unknown. 
Sets worked in the government’s public health service department for seven years until 
she married my (non-Japanese) Grandfather, Chicago native Robert (Bob) Speck in 1957. 
 
 
The wedding of Bob and Setsuko Speck, Private family collection, 1957. 
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In 1958, one year later, Bob and Sets were living in Virginia when they welcomed their 
firstborn child, Susan (Susie) V. Speck, into the world. In 1960, they had my mother, 
Margaret (Margie) L. Speck, and in 1961 had their first son, Robert (Bob) J. Speck. Four 
years later, in 1965, they had their last child, William (Bill) R. Speck. The Specks lived 
in Virginia for three more years until they moved to the tropical paradise of Honolulu, 
Hawaii in July of 1968. 
 
 
Bob and Sets with their first three children (from left to right) Margie, Bob, and Susie in their home in Virginia, 
Private family collection, date unknown. 
 
Setsuko playing with my mother, Margie, as a baby, Private family collection, date unknown. 
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OGAWA FAMILY 
Japanese Ancestors 
 Great-Great-Grandfather Ryujiro Ogawa 
 Great-Great-Grandmother Yei Ogawa 
Issei Generation 
 Great-Grandmother Momoyo Ogawa (b. 1884) 
 Great-Grandfather Toyojiro Ogawa (b. 1872) 
Nisei Generation 
 Great-Uncle Toyohiko (Ed) Ogawa (b. 1908) 
 Great-Aunt Kazuyo (Kay) Ogawa (b. 1909) 
 Great-Aunt Chidori Ogawa (b. 1912) 
 Great-Uncle Joseph (Joe) Ogawa (b. 1915) 
 Grandfather Haruo Ogawa (b. 1922) 
 Great-Aunt Amy Ogawa (b. 1924) 
 
In 1890, at the age of six, my Great-Grandmother Momoyo was adopted into the home of 
Ryujiro Ogawa and his wife Yei. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, Ryujiro had served as 
a samurai at Edo Castle to Ii Kamon No Kami Naosuke, a powerful ally and Chief 
Minister of the 15th Shogun – Tokugawa Yoshinobu. Ryujiro was seriously wounded in 
the battle between the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Meiji forces at Ueno-yama. He 
asked to be killed, but the Meiji officer in charge admired his courage and skill and had 
Ryujiro taken to his home in Tokyo to be nursed back to health. Ryujiro excelled in 
Kendo and became a teacher to the young recruits of the Meiji forces and was later 
appointed to the position of Chief of Police of the Kanagawa Prefecture.  
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The Ogawa Family – Ryujiro, Momoyo & Yei, History of the Ogawa Family, date unknown. 
The site of the Ogawa home was above Yokohama bay on Aoki-machi, in the capital city 
of the Kanagawa Prefecture. In the new Ogawa household, Momoyo lived a completely 
different life as a privileged young lady. She studied the Japanese traditions of flower 
arranging, shamisen, kabuki dance, poetry writing, tea ceremony, and needlework. Her 
mother Yei told Momoyo about the samurai code of honor, bushido, which made a great 
impression on the young child and would later direct her way of life. At age 14, she 
moved to Tokyo to continue her education at Jissen Girls High School in Akasaka, where 
she also had private English lessons with Takashima Kaemon’s daughter who was to be 
married to Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi’s son. 
 
 
Momoyo performing traditional Japanese dances at her 80th Birthday Celebration, Ogawa Family History. 
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Momoyo playing the Shamisen – a traditional Japanese musical instrument – at her 80th Birthday Celebration, 
Ogawa Family History. 
 
In 1892, Momoyo’s future husband, Toyojiro, left Japan for America’s West Coast. From 
1893-1895 he served aboard American naval ships as a mess attendant. On 4 April 1893, 
he signed on to serve on the USS Hanler and served for seven months until 30 October. 
On 27 December 1894, he enlisted at Mare Island to serve on the USS Albatross and was 
discharged on 1 November 1895. During his service, he learned American cooking and 
received commendations from the ship’s captains. 
 
The 20th century opened in Japan at a time threatened by war with Russia. Momoyo 
wished she were a boy so that she could join the Japanese Army and fight for her country, 
but because of her female gender, she decided instead that she could become a nurse and 
help the soldiers wounded in battle. The ex-samurai class had priority to enter and she 
attended the Japan Red Cross Hospital School in Shibuya, Tokyo.  
 
After four years of training, she graduated in October 1903 as a part of the 21st graduating 
class, and hoped to be assigned to a military outfit. Instead, she was sent to the Imperial 
Palace to be the attendant to a 3-year-old member of the imperial family. Disappointed 
with her appointment, she resigned after a few months and returned to the Red Cross 
Hospital. She was then assigned to a Red Cross hospital ship, and served on three 
different ships for 6 months, each as a first class nurse. Momoyo worked for the naval 
officers and the fleet admiral, and received several decorations from the Emperor of 
Japan. She said her most exciting experience was hiding from the imperial Russian fleet 
among the little islands in the Sea of Japan. On shore, she served in military hospitals 
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where they treated both Japanese and Russian soldiers, whose thick beards and long hair 
were full of lice that had to be shaven clean. The Russo-Japanese war ended in 1905 at 
the defeat of the Russian military, which had been considered more powerful and 
modernized than the Japanese. It was the first time the East had defeated a great Western 
power, and would over time transform the balance of power in East Asia and the strength 
of Japan as a world power. 
 
On 19 December 1906, Momoyo and Toyojiro were married. Because Momoyo was 
carrying her adoptive father’s family name, which would otherwise end with her, the 
name “Ogawa” took priority over Toyojiro’s family name of “Akimoto,” and he had to 
take the Ogawa name. In February 1907, he left to establish himself in Hawaii. Momoyo 
and her mother Yei joined him in November, arriving in Honolulu on the steamship 
“America Maru.” 
 
In 1908, Momoyo and Toyojiro had their firstborn child, Toyohiko (Ed) Ogawa, who was 
interestingly enough listed as “Edward Ogawa” in the 1940 census. Only a year later, the 
Ogawa’s first daughter, Kazuyo (Kay), was born in 1909. In 1912 followed another girl, 
Chidori, with still four more children born after her. Joseph (Joe) was next in 1915, then 
Yachiyo in 1918, my Grandfather Haruo in 1922, and finally the youngest, Amy, was 
born in 1924. 
 
 
Ogawa Family, circa 1915 – (from left to right) Momoyo, Joe, Toyojiro, Kazuyo (Kay), Toyohiko (Ed), Chidori & 
Yei, History of the Ogawa Family, 1915. 
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The Ogawa family lived in a little house on a small piece of property Toyojiro purchased 
at 1526 Enos Lane in the Makiki neighborhood of Honolulu. He tore down the existing 
old cottage to replace it with a 3-bedroom house that he built himself. This house 
remained the home of the Ogawa family for the next few generations, and it was where 
both my Papa (Grandfather Haruo) and my father Pat grew up.  
 
Toyojiro was a “Jack-of-all-trades” man who tried many different businesses to make a 
living – teaching American style cooking to Japanese immigrants so they could find jobs 
in Honolulu, running a small grocery store, starting a business supplying some military 
bases with local produce and meats. His last job was as a personal chef for a Schofield 
Barracks general. Unfortunately, Toyojiro developed tuberculosis at a time when there 
were no effective medications and the disease was a death sentence. My Great-
Grandfather died on 9 August 1924. 
 
On 24 July 1924, just two weeks prior to Toyojiro’s death, Yei died bedridden in her 
home. Momoyo suffered the deaths of her husband and her mother within two weeks of 
each other. Then two months later, on 1 October 1924, 6-year-old Yachiyo died in 
isolation at the children’s hospital, diagnosed with diphtheria.  
 
As a trained nurse, Momoyo became a midwife, and was considered one of the best in 
Honolulu. She also served as a special nurse at the Japanese Hospital when officials and 
high-ranking Japanese nationals were hospitalized there. In 1937 the Japan-China war 
began, and Momoyo returned to Japan for a year to do volunteer work for the Japan Red 
Cross Hospital, where she was received with a royal welcome. 
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Ogawa Family, 1941 – (from left to right) Amy, Chidori, Toyohiko (Ed), Momoyo, my Papa Haruo, Kazuyo (Kay) & 
Joe, History of the Ogawa Family, 1941. 
 
All of the Ogawa children attended McKinley High School, but Chidori was the first to 
go to college and earn a degree from the University of Hawaii. This prompted her to 
move to the mainland in 1935, and it was there that she was still located when the 
Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7th. From May 1942 until January 1943, 
Chidori was interned at Santa Anita Assembly Center and the Heart Mountain Relocation 
Center. Fortunately, Chidori was able to take advantage of the early release program put 
forth by the WRA and only spent a short time interned. In a determination to do more for 
the war effort, she decided to enlist in the Women’s Army Air Corps (WAAC), and 
became the first Nisei woman from Hawaii to enlist in the military.  
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Chidori Ogawa dressed in full uniform, History of the Ogawa Family, circa 1944. 
Chidori was assigned in Special Services as a librarian. She was Base Librarian at 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, the headquarters of the 15th Air Force, and then at Andrews 
Air Force Base, Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Washington D.C. She was 
discharged after four years in the service, on 2 June 1948. 
 
My grandfather Haruo was only 19 at the time of Pearl Harbor and stayed at home during 
the war. His military service began with the Korean War, where he boxed in the Army 
and played both baseball and football against professional teams while on the Army’s 
travel team. In 1957, he married my part-Hawaiian Nana, Jeanette Hendrickson, and 
together they had my father, Patrick (Pat) Tadashi Ogawa in 1959. 
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(from left to right) my Nana Jeanette, Momoyo, my father Pat & my Papa Haruo, Private family collection, date 
unknown. 
 
My Great-Grandmother Momoyo never became an American citizen – once a Japanese, 
always a Japanese. She was very proud of her heritage but also proud of her children’s 
accomplishments as American citizens. She received 5 medals in her lifetime, three of 
which were from the Japan Red Cross. The last medal she received was on 18 February 
1974, just a few months before she died at age 89. It was the “Sixth Order of Merit in the 
Order of Sacred Treasure” and was from the Emperor of Japan for her services in helping 
senior citizens at Kuakini Medical Center and as a nurse to society. 
 
 
Momoyo wearing her Red Cross medals (left) and Receiving the “Sixth Order of Merit in the Order of the Sacred 
Treasure” (right), History of the Ogawa Family. 
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Momoyo Ogawa – “once a Japanese, always a Japanese,” Ogawa Family History. 
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MY IMMEDIATE SPECK-OGAWA FAMILY 
 
Sansei Generation 
 Margaret (Margie) Speck Ogawa (b. 1960) 
 Patrick (Pat) Tadashi Ogawa (b. 1959) 
Yonsei Generation 
 Malia Susan Setsuko Ogawa (b. 1992) 
 Keoni Patrick Haruo Ogawa (b. 1995) 
 Nalani Jeanette Toshiko Ogawa (b. 1999) 
 
On the 25th of July in 1987, my parents were married. After both obtaining their 
Bacherlor’s Degrees at the University of Hawaii, they moved to Chicago and attended 
graduate school together at the Kellogg Business School of Northwestern for their 
Master’s Degrees in Business. In 1992, I was born. Three years later, my brother Keoni 
was born, and finally, in 1999, my little sister Nalani was born. All three of us were given 
Hawaiian first names, after our strong racial and cultural ties to Hawaii. Our middle 
names were all chosen in honor of one of our family members – Susan for my mother’s 
sister, Patrick for my father, and Jeanette for my father’s mother. Our parents chose to 
give us significant Japanese names as well – Setsuko for my mother’s mother, Haruo for 
my father’s father, and Toshiko for my mother’s grandmother. 
 
 
Pat and Margie (left), January 2014, and The Ogawa kids in Hawaii – (left to right) Keoni, Nalani & Malia (right), 
circa early 2000s. 
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Unfortunately, all four of my grandparents have passed away at the time of this thesis. 
The last to leave us was the greatest inspiration for this study, my Grandma Setsuko, who 
died the day after my 21st birthday last year. I hope to honor all four of my grandparents 
with this piece. 
 
Haruo Ogawa (left), date unknown, and The final resting place of Haruo and Jeanette Ogawa at the National 
Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, where the men and women who served in the US Armed Forces are forever 
honored (right). 
 
 
Bob and Sets Speck (left), Grandma and Nalani on a family visit to Hawaii (center), Margie taking Sets on a walk 
around the neighborhood (right). 
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